POPREBEL

Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism

Working Paper no. 11

Populist political parties of former Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall

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POPREBEL (Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism) is a large Horizon 2020-funded research project on the rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe. The aim of the project is to describe the phenomenon, create a typology of its various manifestations, reconstruct trajectories of its growth and decline, investigate its causes, interpret its meanings, diagnose its consequences and propose policy solutions.

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The POPREBEL consortium comprises six universities – UCL (co-ordinating institution), University of Belgrade, Charles University, Corvinus University of Budapest, Jagiellonian University and University of Tartu – and Edgeryders, a social enterprise.

1. Introduction

Contemporary populist discourses in countries of the former Yugoslavia are the result of long political processes and turbulent ideological transformations that the countries have gone through. Apart from the recent general rise of populism in Europe, and especially the post-Communist states, to understand contemporary populism, we need to analyse the historical specifics that led to it. In addition to other motives that are an integral part of populism in general (differences between the 'corrupt elites' and 'honest people', anti-pluralism, hostility towards political opponents, etc.), inherited nationalism and egalitarianism are important elements of populist 'thin ideology' in the Western Balkans. The **aim** of this Report is, after presenting a historical background of the most important political and social processes in Yugoslavia, to analyse its disintegration, and the first decade after the disintegration, to gain insight into the wide range of causes that led to contemporary populist narratives in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

We will first present the conceptual framework, methods and research questions. We should reiterate and further elaborate some of the theoretical ideas we have already developed in the previous Report (*Political populism from the fringe to the mainstream: A conceptual framework*). Special emphasis will be placed on nationalism, nativism and egalitarianism as fundamental parts of the development of populist ideology in the former Yugoslavia. Then, the state of the art will be presented, after which we will offer a brief overview of the most important events and processes in Yugoslavia that shaped populism in the Western Balkans. We stress that to understand the development of populism in the former Yugoslavia, it is important to keep in mind the specific historical context: the development of Yugoslav socialism, dissident nationalist factions in Yugoslavia, and the wars after 1990, which was propped up by interethnic tensions. Nationalism and nativism were developed in parallel with anti-communist rhetoric, but not with anti-egalitarianism.

The core of our research are three *case studies*, a brief analysis of the convergent development of democracy, multipartyism and populism. We will carry out the comparative case study of three former Yugoslav republics – Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – but we will also show the similarities in how nationalism (and to some extent egalitarianism) remained a common element of political discourses in all the countries, and how populism was very similarly represented in all three republics in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. For that purpose, we will combine secondary academic literature containing interpretations of leading domestic and foreign experts in this field with our analysis of data on nationalism and egalitarianism obtained from the World Values Survey. In other words, this Report will present an overview of the development of populist narratives and value orientations at the end of the twentieth century with a special emphasis on the awakening of nationalism and the retention of the ideology of egalitarianism (as a consequence of the dominant socialist ideology in the twentieth century).

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2. Activities carried out and results

2.1 Key concepts and methodology

2.1.1 Key concepts

Although populism is not a new concept, it has certainly become a global phenomenon in the recent decades, spurring a prolific academic analysis on the topic. In defining populism, we follow the concept developed by Cas Mudde. Populism is a thin-centred ideology and a discursive strategy that creates an image of a society radically divided into two categories: 'the people' versus 'the elites', where the divide is fundamentally based on a moral distinction, resulting in a conflictive relationship. The elite is self-serving, unresponsive and corrupt, while the virtuous people tend to be glorified as the true representatives of democratic sovereignty (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2019; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). It's a Manichean worldview based on the understanding of politics as struggle where there are only friends and foes, so political opponents are more than just election candidates with different ideological and political profiles – they are represented as deeply corrupt and even evil (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 8; Mudde 2004, 544; see also Report *Political populism from the fringe to the mainstream: A conceptual framework*).

Populism defined in this way implies that its thin ideology can very easily be combined with other ideological programmes. Thus, populism can be associated with nationalism, nativism, egalitarianism, authoritarianism, patriarchal values, etc. It is especially important to note that populism always rejects the idea of pluralism, dialogue, and exchange of opinions. Populist leaders always present themselves as the 'true' and 'authentic' exponents of the 'common people', thus providing themselves legitimacy to refuse dialogue with representatives of the alleged 'corrupt elites'. This is a mechanism by which populism undermines democracy and pluralism and ensures the survival of populist leaders in power (Müller 2017, 15–17; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012, 2; see also Report *Political populism from the fringe to the mainstream: A conceptual framework*).

As has been already observed, populism is easily combined with other ideologies, and especially with nationalism or nativism. For Mudde, nativism is "an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state" (2007, 19). This Mudde's hypothesis is especially important for the context analysed in this Report. Together with egalitarianism (in economic terms), nationalism and nativism supported the development of populism in these three countries.

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Although populism is a discourse constructed and implemented by (political) elites, many authors (such as Stuart Hall) believe that it is important to look at the other side of the populist conjuncture. In other words, the relationship between 'supply' (populist discourse placed from above) and 'demand' (value orientations of wider social strata that are suitable for accepting populist narratives). Scholars typically focus on one side of the explanations (supply or demand). Supply-side approaches concentrate on the party level, focusing on party competition, party organization, the importance of leadership and leadership style, and therefore emphasize parties' agency, e.g., strategies that parties can use to attract voters (see Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015; Taggart, 2000; Van Kessel, 2013). On the demand-side voter preferences for populist parties are explored as reactions to unfavorable political and socioeconomic developments. Since these voter preferences are triggered as a reaction, some authors argue that "the populist voter does not exist" (Rooduijn, 2019, 365), thus representing a 'fertile soil' or a 'suitable context' for populist success meaning that the conditions in a certain country can be interpreted through a populist lens (Taggart, 2000, 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Jenne et al., 2021).Thus the local context and momentum should be in focus when analysing the rise of populism in a certain country.

Apart from looking at the relationship between 'supply' and 'demand', both placed in a historical perspective – populism presupposes long-term and comprehensive work on changing the ideological configuration, and that acceptance can have very deep roots (Birešev and Jovanović Ajzenhamer, 2018, 241-242).

One of the constitutive ideas in various countries of the former Yugoslavia was that the nation was exclusively an ethnically homogeneous group, and the only legitimate political framework in which individuals can act. Consequently, leaders should be nationalistically oriented and insist on a rhetoric aimed at preserving national consciousness, national values, internal coherence, etc. Foundation of such values and policies was perfectly conducive to the development of authoritarianism, and the rise of populist leaders who would make discursive distinctions between 'us' (Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks) and 'them' (those who are not 'our nation').

In the first half of the 1990s, 'narcissism of small differences' was applied in the former Yugoslavia: a useful theoretical concept (initially defined by Sigmund Freud and later developed in the political sphere and academic field by many scholars) that illustrates which symbolic elements (such as religion, language, etc.) populist leaders used to justify hatred, violence and civil war against all 'foreign' elements in homogeneously defined nations (Bakić, 2011). In other words, the logic of populism implies a process of differentiation between 'us' – ordinary and honest people, and 'them' – foreigners and evil people. As such, it created horizontal division between different states and nations in former Yugoslavia. The pattern of constructing the

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enemy, which also existed in socialism, was used again, only now the ethnic *Other* has taken the place of the class enemy (Milosavljević, 1996, 405).

Another important ideological element of the development of populism in the former Yugoslavia is the ideology of egalitarianism. Since the countries of the former Yugoslavia have inherited a socialist legacy, ideals such as class equality have remained prevalent among the wider social strata in all countries of the former Yugoslavia. It should be noted that socialism in Yugoslavia had a specific form – on the one hand, there was a kind of quasi-market (as well as openness to Western culture and societies), and on the other, there was also a system of self-government (*samoupravljanje*). Self-government especially influenced the development of the ideals of egalitarianism among the citizens of Yugoslavia (Županov, 1969) and the consolidation of egalitarian political culture (Pantić and Pavlović, 2009).

Scepticism about a wide range of liberal reforms and especially economic liberalism, and various dissonant tones regarding the introduction of capitalism (which were also initiated by the economic crises that shook this part of the Western Balkans) continued in the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall (see Pešić, 2017). A distinction needs to be made between insisting on egalitarianism, in terms of levelling class differences, and the anti-communist bias, made by contemporary populists in the former Yugoslav countries. In line with their right-wing orientation, contemporary populists insist on being anti-communist (see also Report *Conceptualisation of neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism*), but at the same time present themselves as protectors of those who are materially deprived.

If we keep in mind that egalitarianism and nationalism were the perfect ideological and discursive voter bait, we can complete the picture of the political and social context for the development of populism in the former Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s: this social context required a leader who would easily combine populist strategies with ideas of nationalism and conflict with all those who is not 'us', and with ideas of egalitarianism which imply that populists come 'from the common people', so they can fight against 'rich, corrupt elites'.

Also, when it comes to populist narratives during the 1990s, we should keep in mind the context of the war and the special significance of the nationalist and nativist rhetoric, which was a necessary element in fuelling interethnic hatred. *Ergo,* in the context of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the binary logic of populism, which implies the division into 'us' and 'them', gained an even more extensive role because the primary Others became members of another ethnicity and religion. In this Report, we will see how nationalist and nativist discourse has been built in the republics since the end of the 1960s, escalating during the 1990s.

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Hostility towards members of other nations is also detected in modern research and is used in contemporary populist discourses (see Lutovac, 2017).

Guided by this logic in the case studies of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, we will explore the 'reflection from below', i.e. we will analyse how nationalism, nativism and egalitarianism as value orientations accepted by the majority of the population in all three republics were the basis, but at the same time, a kind of consequence of the nationalist and egalitarian discourses of the national elites.

2.1.2. Research questions and methods

The **aim** of this Report is to provide an overview of the most important political and social processes that shaped populism in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1990–2000. Specifically, we tried to understand the development of populism in these newly founded countries considering the different short- and medium-term processes that shaped it. To achieve this aim, we will try to answer three research questions:

- How did the common Yugoslav heritage set the ground for populist narratives in newly founded states?
- How does populism as a 'thin ideology' combine and cohabitate with the ideas of nationalist (including nativist) and egalitarian narratives during the 1990s in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina?
- How have the 1990s in the three case studies prepared the ground for and help us understand the explosion of populism in 2000s and in comparison, to other post-communist countries?

We decided to focus on the period from 1990 to 2000 for several reasons: a) in 1990, the first multi-party parliamentary elections were held in all three republics; b) at the end of 1999 and beginning of the 2000s, crucial political changes of political regimes occurred; and c) this period is very important for understanding contemporary populism. We argue that to understand the general rise of populism in mid-2000, we should look at the previous decade to grasp the complexity of the phenomenon in the post-Yugoslav space.

After presenting the historical context (crucial events and processes that formulated populism in a common state – Yugoslavia), the three republics will be analysed as *case studies* (Yin, 2014). We will focus on social, historical and political processes that led to the development of populism in each of these countries in an *individual* and *comparative* manner. If we define the methodological framework in our study in this way, we can make a connection between secondary historical, sociological and political academic literature and interpretations of leading domestic and foreign experts in this field, and our analysis of data on value

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orientations. Each of the case studies will contain the historical context and political messages, along with the analysis of value orientations prevalent among the wider social strata in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to analyse value orientations because they are at the same time the basis for receiving populist messages and a consequence of the nationalist and egalitarian discourses presented by politicians (as we said in the Conceptual Framework). The analysis of political messages and significant events will be based mainly on academic literature, while the analysis of value orientations, will rely on the quantitative analysis of available databases (datasets). To measure respondents' nationalism and egalitarianism, we used answers to four questions collected in the World Values Survey (third and fourth waves of the survey, i.e. mid-1990s and beginning of the 2000s). The same questions were used to analyse these orientations in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, so findings for these three countries are completely comparable. Concretely, to measure respondents' nationalism, we used answers to the following two questions: "How proud are you to be a member of your national group?" and "Would you be willing to fight for your country?" In order to test acceptance of egalitarianism, we analysed respondents' answers to the following questions, which are otherwise used to measure economic liberalism: "How would you place your views on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means that incomes should be made more equal and 10 that that we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort?" and "How would you place your views on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means that competition is harmful because it brings out the worst in people and 10 means that competition is good because it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas?"

By analysing the main political messages on the one hand, and events and the dominant value orientations on the other, we get an insight into the relationship between the 'supply' and 'demand' of nationalism, as well as nativism and egalitarianism that function as 'thickeners' of the 'thin ideology' of populism in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.2. State of the Art

To review the state of knowledge on topics related to populism in the countries established after the breakup of Yugoslavia, a comprehensive overview of studies in the field of populism will first be provided.

Besides the seminal works on the topic of populism in general (see above), that are at the core of this Report, we should also give a brief overview of the main academic works on populism in the post-Communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe. In the *Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017), Ben Stanley's chapter on Central and Eastern Europe stresses that the appearance of populism, or "backlash against the technocratic elites of transition was inevitable once the public began to experience the hardships

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of transition" (2017, 185). Stanley argues that from the radical theory perspective, populism "consist in a backlash against the liberal politics of post-communist transition and the elites responsible for implementing these reforms", while from the centrist supply-side theory, "populists would largely exploit dissatisfaction with corrupt and incompetent leaders, rather than rejecting the politics of transition" 2017,185), finding both theories applicable in different case studies of CEE countries.

Since, logically, due to their common communist past, most of the countries experienced right-wing populism, a book by Pirro is dedicated to the radical right-wing populist parties in the region that "have either outshined or paralleled the performance of their Western European counterparts" (2015, 3), and their rise from mid-2000s, claiming that "the populist radical right in Central and Eastern Europe seems to retain features *sui generis*, introducing a combination of old and new politics" (2015, 1). She also claims that, apart from sharing the features of nativism, authoritarianism and populism with the West, "the historical legacies and contextual idiosyncrasies prompted a *different declension* of the populist radical right ideology in Central and Eastern Europe" (2015:2).

Consistent with Pirro's line of argument, more recent *Taking Stock of Shock. Social consequences of the 1989 Revolutions* (Ghodsee and Orenstein, 2021) provides a thorough analysis of the causes of the rise of the right-wing populism in CEE, by linking socioeconomic and political divisions. Basically, the transition to capitalism generated 'the largest and most enduring economic collapse to affect any world region in modern history', leaving lot of losers of the transition (see also Maldini, 2018, 40), who were an easy target of the right-wing populist, since the leftist parties, due to their communist past and their turn towards EU integration and liberal policies, basically distanced themselves from their traditional voters: the workers and the socially endangered. Thus, Ghodsee and Orenstein confirmed that populist politicians, depending on the context, find a "fertile soil" and adapt their strategies to attract votes.

When it comes to the countries of the former Yugoslavia, especially the period that is object of this study, there is a general lack of studies on populism before the first decades of the 21st century (Grbeša and Šalaj, 2018). A reason for that could be the focus of scholars on the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the nationalism, and the conflicts, producing a prolific amount of work on these topics. If regard nativism as an exclusionary version of nationalism, we can certainly draw from that literature, too, or at least give a different perspective of the phenomenon within the studies of populism. Populism research grew only in the period after the 2000s (as also observed by Pirro in the case of CEE countries) and focused on some newly established parties such as *Živi zid* (2011) and *Most* (2012) in Croatia (there are already PhD dissertations dedicated to them: Čačija 2016; Knežević 2018; Ramić 2016). Despite the increase in the number of small-scale case studies, there is a lack of analyses of populism over a longer historical period focused on a single former Yugoslav

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republic, party, or leader. Consequently, there is also a lack of in-depth analyses of the interaction between 'corrupt elites' and 'the common people', mobilising practices, appeal of 'the people', etc. Although there has been an increase in studies on populism in Croatia and Serbia by political scientists and sociologists, they focus on particular political actors or political parties in the context of populism over a short period (Mustapić and Hristić 2017; Mustapić, Balabanić and Plenković 2019; Veselinović 2018). Contrary to the view of those scholars who see populism as a recent issue exclusively (although we do agree that it has become an increasing issue in the last decades), this Report argues that there are connections with the Yugoslav period and especially in the 1990s that set the ground for the rise of populism in mid-2000s and help explain contemporary populism. Also, in line with Pirro, populism in Central and Eastern Europe has specific features in comparison to Western Europe due to the transition from communism to democracy, a shared characteristic with the post-Yugoslav space, which also represents its own differences in comparison to the CEE region due to its specificities (disintegration of a multi-national state and the subsequent wars).

To detect historical continuities in the populist thought and carry out our research on the historical background and the 1990s development of populism as a 'thin ideology' (Stanley 2008), we drew from numerous primary and secondary sources, originating from a wide range of disciplines, mostly history, but also from sociology, political theory, law, investigative journalism and media research. So, while there is a lack of academic research on populism in the region as such, there are other related topics that will be used for this Report. These topics are presented in the following paragraphs of this section.

1. *Dissolution of Yugoslavia*. The breakup of Yugoslavia has undoubtedly generated a wide-ranging literature on Yugoslav politics. On the one hand, the corpus of academic and non-academic sources dedicated to this topic is a rich source for future research on related topics, such as populism and its connection with growing nationalism (especially nativism, its exclusionary version) and authoritarianism. In this regard we draw from the most cited article by Dejan Jović, who listed seven reasons for the dissolution of the SFRY: economic reasons, ancient ethnic hatred, nationalism, cultural reasons, international politics, role of personality, and fall of empires (Jović 2001, 101).

On the other hand, intense debates on the dissolution of Yugoslavia that showed numerous interconnections between the political processes in different republics usually gravitated towards *modernisation theories*. It seems that all scholars who work in this area, regardless of whether they are from former Yugoslav republics or elsewhere, tend to write in the tradition that is best dubbed as the integral political history of Yugoslavia. They focus in particular on the final stage of its existence that they approach it as a critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007), and with it, on halting or even the reversal of modernisation (Bakić 2011; Bieber & Galijaš 2016; Cohen and Dragović-Soso 2004; Đokić 2003; Jović 2003; Lydall 1989; Pettifer 2001; Ramet 2002;

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Woodward 1995). Therefore, since debates on the dissolution of the SFRY focused on the 'modernisation theory' and the socioeconomic changes that prompted general destabilisation, they facilitated the later understanding of populism as one of the consequences of the dissolution, which is one of the usual starting points in that type of populism studies.

Knowledge resulting from debates on the breakup of Yugoslavia is undoubtedly useful for several reasons. First, it is helpful for the identification of political events essential for the rise of populist ideologies/strategies, but also for the role of particular actors in political changes, media coverage of political events, institutional relations important for the mobilisation of certain ideological factions, etc. Reasons which are important to have in mind for later scientific research in this type of discourse is the authors' often pessimistic view on the history of Yugoslavia; also, scholars studying their countries of origin commonly become biased and have an ideologically coloured approach or emotional attitude regarding the topic. Therefore, this type of knowledge usually departs from the mainstream academic political theory and history of Yugoslavia. Having such subversive characteristics or being a sort of liberal discursive practice, this corpus of knowledge could be seen as the predecessor of the current scientific approach to populism in this project.

2. *Discourses on political leaders and political elites*. Aside from debates on the disintegration of the SFRY which leaned towards or even succeeded in the construction of integral versions of politics in the Balkans during the 1980s and 1990s, mainstream research focused on political practices and discourse of particular political leaders or political elites. In this line of research there are three types of publications:

1. studies on political leaders by political scientists, historians or intellectuals writing from the standpoint of witnesses of their time, such as journalist discourse on political leaders;
2. studies on political elites in which, besides the problems of their formation and strategy for existence in a social structure, to a certain degree there are explanations for the rise of nationalism and authoritarianism, egalitarianism, return to patriarchal values, ethnic relations and hatred, creation of enemies, etc.;
3. discourse analysis of political speeches of the main political leaders as critical discourse analysis, and rarely analysis of content.

(1) These studies reflect the 'era of presidents' political historiography, which was fashionable during the Cold War in the 1970s and still has a commercial value and arouses huge interest among the public. Studies on political leaders often lie at the crossroads of political theory and investigative journalism, and with some rare examples, of mainstream historiography. So, to be precise, these studies belong more to the humanities. For studies of populism, this type of sources is precious in many ways, especially because they follow the personality and practices of a particular leader, and the process of that leader's rise to power and ruling

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style. In this group, scholars turned their attention primarily to Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the first President of independent Croatia Franjo Tuđman, but also Stipe Šuvar, Milan Kučan, etc. (Antonić 2002; Čulić 2014; Helmerich 2005; Jakovina 2020; Jović 2018).

In general, this type of publications lacks a strictly defined methodology, with scientific conclusions that are highly reliant on the interviews conducted by the scholars themselves with members of political elites or with witnesses of crucial events from Yugoslavia's past. An example of this approach is Jović's research on Slobodan Milošević (Jović 2018). In that respect, even in the best examples of books on political leaders in the Western Balkans, there always looms the danger of one-sidedness. A completely different approach in books on political leaders can be seen in the versatile discourse of journalist Marinko Čulić, who wrote about Tuđman (Čulić 2014); he wrote without concern for methodology, political theory or use of the social method of research, and showed how much the author's in-depth witnessing and understanding of local political practices, and overall wide range of intellectual knowledge and interest could help in the approach to complex Balkan personalities, such as Tuđman. However, when we accessed this kind of publications as a group, we were driven to the conclusion that focusing on particular political personalities and their practices leaves many other important contextual features on the wayside, such as institutional and mobilising practices, public appeal of their practices and discourse, reactions and reception among 'the common people', etc. After all, these studies dedicated to political leaders combine the use of secondary sources and newly conducted interviews, and in some cases the use of primary sources of institutional, often party origin (Jakovina 2020).

(2) In the last two decades*, political leaders as part of elites* or elite power struggles have caught the attention of sociologists and political scientists, who approach their topic relying on a more developed social science methodology. In this line of studies, research and interpretation were conducted more theoretically sophisticated, with a comparative use of different sources (Antonić 2006; Burg 1986; Gordy 1999; Dragović-Soso 2002), ranging from new data obtained via surveys or semi-structured interviews, to analysis of the media, memoirs and archival sources. Finally, as an exception, there comprehensive qualitative and quantitative studies on elites in Serbia, their recruitment and reproduction (Lazić 2011; Lazić 2016; Jovanović, Radović and Marković 2016). They tend to pay attention to the long period from the end of the Second World War until the contemporary post-conflict transitional period of Serbian history. Therefore, we conclude that in research on political elites, scholarly work ranges from descriptive and free-style interpretations to more rigorous studies that use one or more of the established social scientific methodologies. With those characteristics, research on political elites and power struggle issues is invaluable for further enhancement and

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development of studies on populism, especially those that deal with elite nationalism and authoritarianism (Petrović and Radoman 2016; Spasić 2006) or power struggles, as does (Gordy 1999).

(3) Case studies analysing the political speech of leaders constitute a separate type. They utilize discourse analysis, often employed in the studies on populism. Therefore, even without following a strictly defined procedures of content analysis, several case studies on political discourse of Tuđman and Milošević provide a solid scientific basis for further research (Birač 2019; Đurašković 2014). A drawback of this approach has already been criticised in general studies of populism, as "focus on words and ideas becomes detached from the world of political practice", and "less attention is given to what 'the people' think and want" (Grdešić 2019, 14) when focus is exclusively on speeches of political personalities.

3. *Political parties, movements and other political institutional issues.* Besides the discourse on political leaders that flourished at the end of SFRY (The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), scholars also paid special attention to political parties and movements. The examination of the practices and discourses of political parties led numerous scholars to decisive problems such as the first multi-party elections and the introduction of a multi-party system. It is important to note that this field of knowledge has been established primarily by scholars in political sciences and sociologists with an academic background. In addition to them, law scholars widely took part in the research on political parties and movements, which shed additional light on the process of legitimation of elections, and crucial political changes from the one-party to the multi-party system in the 1990s, to later election practices, etc. (Ajzenhamer Jovanović and Dajč 2019; Birešev and Jovanović Ajzenhamer 2018; Dajč and Pantelić 2019; Siljanovska Davkova 2006; Dejanović 2013; Dejanović 2014; Dejanović 2017; Dejanović, Stjepanović and Pobrić 2011; Goati 2002; Lutovac 2006; Obradović 1996; Pantić and Pavlović 2009). Another branch of this type of publications is dedicated to case studies on certain political parties, as an integral overview on their practices and discourse (Knežević 2015; Nikić-Čakar 2009). Even without focusing on populism, case studies on right-wing political parties were an important source for research on populism because they usually examine primary sources, such as party newspapers and magazines, statutes, memoirs of party leaders and members, and collections of leaders' speeches. This corpus of knowledge is also important for enabling more complex social research methods, such as content analysis or critical discourse analysis, and for detecting and preparing for semi-structured interviews.

Although there is abundant data derived from primary sources, such as historical documents of political parties, their leaders and members, and from media sources and research results obtained by social scientists, which we analysed in this chapter that deals with several issues important for research on populism, all these sources remained at the level of case studies on certain events, parties or political leaders. In this respect, several authors mentioned earlier examined the numerous interesting issues related to the

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development of populism without outright mentioning it. The corpus of analysed data could serve as a basis and inspiration for continuing with thorough research and developing an interpretation that could be comparable to current projects in other Central European countries. The aforementioned scholars largely agreed that the rise to power of certain (populist) leaders was followed by authoritarianism, ethnic hatred and especially overall nationalism, which was thoroughly analysed, with scholars often blaming certain republics or leaders for the decline in the quality of political culture or federal entity. Still, their observations remained at the level of conclusions that relied on interviews of political leaders, or on media coverage of political events. Few scholars diverged from the usual discourse, and even they were not keen on grappling the interactive net of populism; Kurspahić did it with a thorough media analysis of construction and complicity in the rise of populism in the Balkans (Kurspahić 2003), and Milosavljević with a focus on the production of enemies in the SFRY (Milosavljević 1996). Therefore, in order to present more integral and comparable research results, and thereby enrich the existing political analysis with the methodology of populism we chose, all former Yugoslav republics will be examined. Indeed, only after a comprehensive overview of right-wing parties and their leaders in all republics of the former SFRY, could the strategy of merging existing knowledge with newly collected data (semi-structured interviews, media sources, content analysis) be started, leading to rewarding scientific results on this issue.

The strategy for enhancing existing knowledge to present comparative scientific results on the rise and development of populism in the former Yugoslav republics is as follows:

1. Research on the development of authoritarianism, nationalism, egalitarianism, return to patriarchal values, etc., from the first stage of existence of Federal Yugoslavia, the second half of the 20th century, until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, with special attention to continuity and basis of certain values, practices, concepts, etc.
2. Mapping the main points in the activities of political parties that led to populism, according to the corpus of primary and secondary sources regarding those parties' discourses and practices, such as their campaigns for the first multi-party elections in 1990 and later elections, and the main events they use for mobilising practices and the construction of an 'interactive' net of 'the corrupt elites' and 'the people'.
3. Merging the supply- and demand- side of analysis on populism; dealing with the construction of both populist entities 'elites' and 'people'.

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2.3. Key historical periods for understanding populism after the end of Yugoslavia

2.3.1. Precursor: the beginnings of the idea of social egalitarianism as the foundation of populist rhetoric and the attitude towards nationalism

After the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the government, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia overpowered the parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition, as well as all other non-communist institutions in society. The communist government did not tolerate any opposition. If the criticism of the government came from outside, it was declared hostile, and if it came from its own ranks, it was called counter-revolutionary (Danilović 2010, 194–195).

The period of elimination of political parties in communist Yugoslavia and the establishment of the highest type of democracy – 'people's democracy' had a unique path, occurring in two stages. During the first stage (1944–1946), civic political parties that did not enter the Popular Front were eliminated. In the second stage, the government targeted political parties that emerged as the 'Front opposition'. Thus, the Popular Front first served as a means to obscure the real political situation, after which it was used to establish a one-party dictatorship (Cvetković 2005, 125).

Political activities outside the Front were virtually impossible because the protagonists of non-Front policies would be under public pressure, while the authorities would treat their political parties as illegal organisations, whose goals were identified with the militarily defeated counter-revolution (Petranović 1998, 72–73). Even in the first months of communist Yugoslavia, Tito did not hide his attitude towards the opposition parties: "The opposition is an old camp of enemies of the people, who are pulling the wheel of history back" (Pavlović 2007, 97). The open opposition to the multi-party system began at the First Congress of the Yugoslav People's Front (held from 5–7 August 1945) and practically did not stop for as long as that state existed.

After the end of the war, the SKJ was not inclined to accept the renewal of pre-war civic parties, but instead sought to accelerate the differentiation among their members through their centres (Petranović 1979, 313). Despite the wishes of the new authorities to introduce their own, monolithic socio-political system as soon as possible, international considerations towards the allies, especially the United Kingdom, influenced the SKJ leadership to take their 'recommendations' into account and, until the elections to the Constituent Assembly, enable other parties to work. The party used the existing organisation of the United People's Liberation Front, transformed it into the People's Front of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ) and absorbed all the political actors it could. In this way, it respected the 'recommendations' of the Allies, and yet controlled the entire political scene in Yugoslavia (Petranović 1979, 931).

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At the founding congress held in Belgrade from 5–7 August 1945, there was an organisational unification of national liberation fronts of Yugoslav countries and their unification under a common name – the People's Front of Yugoslavia (Narodni Front Jugoslavije), later renamed into the Socialist Federation of the Working People of Yugoslavia (Socijalistički Savez Radnog Naroda Jugoslavije- SSRNJ) . The SSRNJ had a mixed character, with political, ideological and social aspirations. Through this organisation, the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia advocated the consolidation of democratic achievements and the building of a new Democratic Federal Yugoslavia. The statute of this political organisation allowed for the existence of political parties. However, all political parties that entered the SSRNJ were so strictly controlled that they soon lost their party characteristics (Pavlović 2007, 98). Some of these parties and groups were held in the SSRNJ until 1948 (Republican Party, United Agrarian Party). In any case, political parties integrated into the SSRNJ, along with those that remained outside it, under constant pressure from this organisation, failed to become independent and to exist independently as they had in the period before the Second World War, and to become political actors in the new state (Petranović 1995, 40).

However, with the absorption of all political actors in Yugoslavia by the People's Front, the ideas of the political parties which had been developing in the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for decades were spontaneously absorbed as well. Although the leaders of the SKJ had a steady course, their ideas, like the populist idea of social egalitarianism, were not the *sui generis* product of that party. On the contrary, many political parties, in parallel with the SKJ, have for years strengthened the understanding of people that their natural equality, seen in their same rights and obligations, is reflected in the obligation of society to organise itself in such a way as to ensure social equality in society. Many of these ideas, along with secret ideas about the need to strengthen their nations and their nations' 'inviolability' in general, had been developed by parties for decades.

However, while the parties of the left advocated the protection of workers' rights, and then the rights of peasants, the 'bourgeois' parties also tried to attract the attention of voters by advocating a similar policy. During the period of the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) in the discourse of , the 'little man' and the desire to improve and unify the quality of his life as much as possible was one of the most important programme principles of almost all parties (centre parties, such as the Democratic Party and Independent Democratic Party; centre-right parties, Croatian People's Peasant Party, People's Radical Party, Slovene People's Party and Yugoslav Muslim Organisation; or right parties, such as the Yugoslav Radical Community).

Certain populist provisions of the programme (mostly 'bourgeois') of parliamentary parties in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes-Yugoslavia, set the bases for complete social egalitarianism, which came with the policy of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Popular Front. In an effort to use their

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programme to please as many voters as possible, which consisted mostly of peasants, but also of an increasing number of workers, the parties promised them egalitarianism in the division of land, social protection, access to work, in short: equality in terms of quality of life. Later, the unification of the parties into the Popular Front was facilitated in part by the fact that the political direction of many parties coincided with the policy of the League of Communists, which, as a sovereign, stood over the entire Front.

2.3.2. The period from the late 1960s until Tito's death

The late 1960s and 1970s were one of the most important periods of Yugoslav history, which affected not just Yugoslavia in its later stages, but political life in countries that appeared after the dissolution of Yugoslavia as well. Many events that happened during this period become reference points for political thought in later period. Additionally, certain ideas and narratives that appeared or developed during these years (such as nationalism, or critique of bureaucratic elites) were later integrated into populist narratives. Some of these events will be presented below, though we will not focus on these events as such, but on ideas and narratives that followed them. Furthermore, we will pay attention to political confrontations that were part of these events and that prepared the ground for later political conflicts in Yugoslavia and its successor states.

To understand these events, we should take into account the developments that preceded them and, in a way, made them possible. At this point, we should mention that after the Tito–Stalin split in 1948, Yugoslavia tried to disassociate itself from Stalinist countries. This drift away from Stalinism was marked by the introduction of self-government and easing of state repression. This process resulted in cultural liberalisation that was evident from the late 1950s (such as the Yugoslav Black Wave), while in the economic and political spheres it resulted in demands for decentralisation. It could be argued that without cultural liberalisation, some of the events discussed in this section would not have been possible (such as student protests). As regards the demands for decentralisation, one of the main axes of political conflict was in fact the struggle between the actors that supported decentralisation and introduction of a market economy and those that advocated a centralised state. This struggle can be seen in all the events that will be presented in this section, and over time it became more than a conflict over the form of government. It became grounds for formulating nationalist narratives. Advocates of decentralisation were usually from Croatia and Slovenia and their "arguments were often accompanied by a widespread rejection of Yugoslavism, which they saw as merely a mask for Serbian hegemony" (Dragović-Soso 2002, 29). It should be noted that by 1960s, proponents of decentralisation managed to some extent to "redefine Yugoslavia as a federation of sovereign states" in the

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Constitution of 1963, which "reintroduced the nations' rights to self-determination and secession" (Dragović-Soso 2002, 30). Moreover, Aleksandar Ranković (Vice-President and head of state security forces, one of the most notable proponents of a centralised state) lost power and his "political liquidation opened the door to both further decentralisation and liberalisation", while "new series of constitutional amendments were passed, giving greater power to the republics at the expense of the federation" (Dragović-Soso 2002, 31).

1. *The student protests of 1968* were the first large-scale wave of public unrest in Yugoslavia that "altered the political dynamics" and were "the most crucial episode in the state's slow unravelling" (Mujanović 2018, 62, 70). The Yugoslav student protests were not merely a local manifestation of worldwide protests of 1968, since the students protested "in the name of the principles of the communist system and against its hypocritical and frustrating reality" (Kanzleiter 2008, 219). Kanzleiter argues that since the Yugoslav system was "neither entirely Stalinist nor completely capitalist, students in Yugoslavia were protesting explicitly against both" (Kanzleiter 2008, 222), simultaneously calling for "democratisation" and protested against "capitalist restoration", summarised well in one slogan: "Down with the red bourgeoisie!" (Kanzleiter 2008, 222), so it could be argued that the primary target of the protests were bureaucratic elites, seen by students as someone who "through their control of individual enterprises and political offices had established themselves as a new class of exploiters" (Mujanović 2018, 69). Though this critique of bureaucratic elites was 'invented' during the protests, it is one of their most important legacies since it was heavily used in later years by populists in different republics.

Although "Tito said that students had good reasons to protest, the SKJ started a lasting campaign against the student movement and its supporters immediately after the strike ended" (Kanzleiter 2008, 224). The protests had many unintended consequences and, instead of democratising, they led to the "final authoritarian mutation that would result in the extinction of the self-governed society as a whole" (Mujanović 2018, 70). In that vein, "the conservative wing of the party transformed 'anarcho-liberalism' into its preferred term for the domestic democratic opposition" and presented demands for democratising Yugoslavia "as an attempt by shadowy bourgeois elements to initiate the counterrevolution" and weaken the state (Mujanović 2018, 59). In the following years, some of the key leaders of the student movement were arrested and sentenced, and the 'liberal' party leadership in Serbia was forced to resign (Kanzleiter 2008, 224), as well as in Croatia, due to other reasons (see below).

2. Aside from the student protests, a different kind of protests took place in Priština, Kosovo in November 1968, calling for an "independent Albanian-language university, the status of a republic and even union with Albania" (Dragović-Soso 2002, 40). These protests are important for understanding both Albanian and Serbian nationalism. Just a few months earlier, Dobrica Ćosić (Serbian writer, elected in 1992 as President of

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the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) warned about Albanian nationalism, claiming that it was endangering Serbs, perceiving decentralisation as the main cause. During his speech at the Fourteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (29 May 1968), Ćosić mentioned many ideas that were shocking at that moment, but later became commonplace in nationalist narrative (such as: theme of national unity, theme of endangered nation, critique of 'anti-Serbian' communist elites).

3. *MASPOK (masovni pokret* - mass movement*) / Croatian Spring*. Though in the narrow sense Croatian Spring started in 1971 with mass protests, many events happened in the previous 5 years (1966–1971) that shaped not just the future of Yugoslavia, but different nationalist narratives (mostly Croatian and Serbian). One of the first chapters of the Croatian Spring might be labelled 'linguistic nationalism' (Ribić 2008, 60). In 1967, over a hundred Croatian intellectuals signed the Declaration Concerning the Name and Position of the Croatian Literary Language, demanding "the right of each nation to protect the attributes of its national identity and to fully develop not only its economy but also its culture" (Dragović-Soso 2002, 31). The response from Serbian intellectuals came in the Proposal for Consideration written by members of the Association of Writers of Serbia, claiming that each nation has a legitimate right to make decisions regarding the name and position of language and demanded the same rights for Serbian people in Croatia (Dragović-Soso 2002, 33, 34). Hence, for Croatian intellectuals "common (Serbo-Croatian) language represented a threat to Croatian identity and sovereignty, while for their Serbian counterparts, any assertion of Croatian independence was a threat to Serbian unity", since they perceived Croatian demands as unprincipled because their call for "decentralisation only applied to Yugoslavia, but not to their own republic" (Dragović-Soso 2002, 34).

By 1971, Matica Hrvatska, one of the key institutions in the Croatian Spring, demanded a Croatian constitution which would define Croatia as "the unique national state of the Croatian nation" and emphasised "the voluntary nature of Croatia's association with Yugoslavia, confirming the right to self-determination including secession", and would also define Croatian as its official language (Dragović-Soso 2002, 42).During the autumn of 1971, "intellectuals joined forces with the student movement, demanding together the creation of independent Croatian territorial forces, a separate foreign policy and Croatian representation in the United Nations and the revision of Croatia's borders at the expense of Herzegovina and Montenegro" (Dragović-Soso 2002, 42). On the other hand, Serbs in Croatia demanded the federalisation of Croatia. During the Croatian Spring, Serbian and Croatian nationalist narratives were formed in relation to each other. Many of the ideas mentioned in this section were heavily used by populists in later periods.

In the aftermath of the Croatian Spring, Yugoslav authorities mostly punished reformists and the left wing of the SKJ (Mujanović 2018, 71). Some of the most prominent liberals in the League of Communists of Croatia were expelled from the party (along with Serbian liberals mentioned in the previous section), while a great

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bulk of the participants ended in prison. Some of the expelled party members argued that these events were not merely a reaction against the national movement in Croatia, but against the introduction of a "free market, democratisation and further federalisation of the state and the Party itself" (Perović 1993, 425–426). Apart from the creation of nationalist narratives and political confrontations, an important legacy of the Croatian Spring is 'national homogenisation' that brought together "the Party leadership, intellectuals and wider segments of society around the goal of creating a national state" and "set a precedent for what was to take place in Serbia and Slovenia in the latter part of the 1980s" (Dragović-Soso 2002, 47).

4. *The Constitution* promulgated on 21 February 1974 was the fourth constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and it has often been argued that it was one of the "contributing factors leading to Yugoslavia's disorderly and bloody dissolution" (Dimitrijević 1994, 1). Some authors believe that the 1974 Constitution was a result of protests (both the student protests of 1968 and the Croatian Spring) and that it deliberately created conditions for the development of nationalism that "would be used to subvert growing popular resentment against entrenched and corrupt political elites" (Mujanović 2018, 67). Additionally, after the expulsion of liberal forces from the party, its leadership "sought to roll out a hollow version of the original left critique" by "radically decentralising the state institutionally, but with few political reforms beyond this" (Mujanović 2018, 71).

From a strictly legal standpoint, the 1974 Constitution "weakened the federation by paralysing the decision-making process and removing real legal effect of federal decisions" (important decisions had to be made by consensus between republics) and "provided for the right to self-determination and secession without, however, envisaging the corresponding procedure" (Dimitrijević 1994, 30). The Constitution had many real political consequences. The vagueness of the Constitution regarding the right to secession helped to ignite nationalist conflicts. Since it was not clear who could secede and under what conditions, the right to secession became a prominent theme of nationalist conflicts. For example, Croatians believed that Croatia as a republic had this right, while Serbs believed that this right belonged to the Serbian minority living in Croatia as well.

2.3.3. The period from Tito's death until the fall of the Berlin Wall (1980-1989)

This period could be described as an economic and political crisis. In addition to several other factors, over-indebtedness of Yugoslavia was the main problem without a solution (further on economic issues: Petranović 1988, 445-452; Lempi 2004, 285-293). Uneven economic development of the republics was woven into the core of the federation from its start. After Tito's death, on the one hand, dissatisfaction increased in the

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wealthier western part of the federation – Slovenia and Croatia, which opted for independence at the end of this period. On the other hand, in spite of the persistent investments all republics made into the poorest areas of the SFRY, these regions remained underdeveloped. This was the case with Kosovo, where the signs of the crisis within the federation first started to emerge in 1981.

The period after Tito's death was marked by the rise of nationalism, which was accompanied by new waves of popular mobilisation, and by the fractal development of the paradigms 'elite-common' and 'people-saviour'. The span from the death of Yugoslavia's leader until 1989 will be discussed by analysing several phenomena in chronological order, as follows.

1. Although scholars have different opinions on the Kosovo issue in the late stages of the SFRY, they all agree that the issue was kept under control under Tito's rule. After his death, crisis ensued (see further in Stamova 2007). Branko Petranović, writing as a contemporary, without historical distance, concluded that "the erroneous policy of the Yugoslav leadership towards Kosovo, which had allowed Kosovo to develop in isolation since the late 1960s, satisfying on the other hand the unreasonable demands of the Kosovo bureaucracy to expand Kosovo's autonomous competencies to transform its autonomous status into a republican one, continued after this demonstration of separatism and nationalism. However, the far-reaching goals of the Albanian nationalists and the anti-Yugoslav leadership policy were obvious" (Petranović 1988, 449–450). For studies on populism, it is important to note the complex structure of conflicting groups in this issue – Albanian nationalists, Serbian nationalists, Serbian and Kosovo media reporting on the issues, the construction mediated by the Serbian elite, members of various groups, Serbian intellectuals under Association of Writers of Serbia, etc. Having in mind just the power struggles between all these groups can help in understanding how the Serbian minority in the predominantly Albanian territory received public attention, and how it led to the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution at the end of the 1980s. After all, it should be highlighted that Kosovo had not become an official issue in Yugoslavia until 1981, but after being declared a crisis of federal importance, it was put on the top of the agenda of the Serbian Communist League and their leader Slobodan Milošević (compare Petranović 1988, 450).

2. The first official debate against the disintegration of the SFRY happened in 1984, showing widespread dissatisfaction among Party members with the Party's federalisation, and ranging from the issue of confederation to the broadest views on the problems and negative phenomena in Yugoslav society. That same year, the first conflicting debate among intellectuals arose in the SFRY, with obvious construction of enemies and unwanted intellectuals, especially at the level of Croatian and Serbian republics. The debate occurred due to the 1984 publication made by the Centre for Information and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the

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League of Communists of Croatia at the request of Stipe Šuvar, colloquially named *The White Book*.[1] The intention was obviously to mobilise the public against conceptual opponents who were 'enemies of Yugoslavia'. The document listed intellectuals, artists, writers and other dissidents whose works or statements did not fit into the ideological party framework, like-minded Party members, and intellectuals. This list showed that nationalists and pseudo-nationalists in Serbia and Slovenia were labelled 'ideological opponents' and that in Croatia, artists with leftist tendencies were unwanted. Although in the overall economic and political federal crisis, *The White Book* may not seem significant, it contributed to a hostile atmosphere, and constructed and declared 'enemies of Yugoslav survival' in an aggressive way which attracted enormous public attention.

3. Many scholars saw Serbian nationalism or Slobodan Milošević's radical nationalism as the main reason for the dissolution of the federation (starting with Bilandžić 1986), epithomized in the *Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences and* Arts (SANU- Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti), published in autumn 1986. The Memorandum laid down all postulates of Serbian nationalism, presenting Serbia both as dissatisfied in the federation and as saviour, emphasising the injustices made to the Serbian people, and expulsion from the centuries-old hearth of Kosovo.

4. The emergence of nationalist leaders in all former republics and the ensuing wars for Yugoslav heritage would have been impossible without media construction of enemies, support and development of their political discourse and practices (compare: Milosavljević 1996; Kurspahić 2003). The column that had a particular influence in that regard was 'Echoes and reactions' ('*Odjeci i reagovanja*') of the Belgrade daily *Politika,* launched in July 1988 and ran until March 1991. During that period, more than four thousand articles were published. *Politika* (1987–1989) was under the influence of Slobodan Milošević and contributed to his rise to power. The uniform argumentative structures in the letters and the fact that they coincided with the texts on the regular pages of *Politika* clearly indicated the use of the column for the purpose of 'popular' confirmation of the dominant political discourse (compare Mimica and Vučetić 2001). The letters and "readers'" reactions in this column served to establish a relationship and communication between Slobodan Milošević as the saviour of the dissatisfied and the 'common people'. Namely, this column was virtually created to "express the will of the 'common people'" on the key issues of the turbulent period of the late 1980s, and advocated hatred against Albanians, Croats and Slovenians.

5. Orchestrated and facilitated by the media, the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution was a "wave of popular mobilisation, which took place primarily in Serbia in the summer and fall of 1988, sharpened the country's

[1] Its original title was *On some conceptual and political tendencies in art, and literary, theatre and film criticism, and on public appearances of a number of cultural creators containing politically unacceptable messages*.

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political crisis, gave momentum to Serbian nationalism and increased power of Serbia's leader Slobodan Milošević" (Grdešić 2016, 774-775). Namely, it began with the 8th Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) in 1987 and ended with the realisation of its main goal – personnel changes that enabled the actual and formal abolition of the provinces in early 1989 and the supremacy of Serbia in the federal authorities (cf. Milosavljević 2003, 319). The *working class*, as the basis of socialist self-government, was replaced by *ethnic identities* on the public and political scene, while the Yugoslav leadership, which had issues at lower levels, was replaced by a single- Serbian- republic leadership, which had the ambition to solve the problems of the federal state. The bureaucracy against which the revolution broke out was recognised among *all other* (*provincial, republican, federal*) *leaders who must be replaced*, and the only demand of the revolution was that the plebiscite stand by their republican/national leader and a blind acceptance of the changes he offered (Milosavljević 2003, 320). In this case, the cult of the new national leader was formed, where plebiscite support was presented as well-organised and spontaneous mass gatherings of people, with slogans that indicated the next political actions of their own bureaucracy. The Anti-bureaucratic Revolution was no more than a slow-motion coup by means of which Milošević hoped to reverse the SFRY's (perceived) post-1974 liberalisation, and reassert authoritarian centralism through his leadership under the guise of thinly veiled Serbian nationalism (Mujanović 2018, 74-75).

This political event was instrumentalised by the media, primarily the daily press and, above all, the column 'Echoes and reactions' in *Politika*, which both took part in and reported on the revolution. In line with its multi-layered populist features, this revolution soon changed its name into 'Event of the people' ('*Događanje naroda*'), which was organised through "spontaneous" gatherings of people whose slogans seemingly expressed the "will of the people", but in fact they indicated and facilitated future political actions and legitimised extra-institutional methods. But, "the voice of the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution did not constitute either the social demand of the workers or the voice of the people. Furthermore, the analysis of the participants in the column, which covered the period 1988–1991 and 4,127 published texts, found that only 12 letters were signed by officials and that only four came from members of the working class. On the other hand, 170 letters were signed by people with PhD degrees, 123 by professors, 122 by PhD professors, etc." (Mimica and Vučetić 2001, 46). After the leadership was completely replaced in both provinces, Milošević or the "people" continued to organise "spontaneous" gatherings, including those at Ušće in Belgrade, in Montenegro, Kosovo and Gazimestan. According to *Politika*, the largest rally of all was held at Gazimestan on 28 June 1989.

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2.4. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of Yugoslavia

2.4.1. Case study – Serbia

Serbia was the last former Yugoslav republic to hold the first multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections (9 December 1990) after the breakdown of socialism. In addition, Serbia was the only republic that retained the former nomenclature in power. In Serbia, the Socialist Party of Serbia – SPS, led by Slobodan Milošević, won the 1990 elections by a landslide. The first parliamentary and presidential elections were preceded by the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution and mass mobilisation of the population through a series of protests founded on nationalist ideology. Nationalism was induced from above (by the elites), but it was also established among wider social strata (i.e., nationalist ideology enjoyed support from below, as well). In other words, there was both nationalist 'supply' and 'demand' in that period. "The wave of mobilisation served as the vehicle which transformed various socio-economic and political, nationalist and non-nationalist struggles into nationalist conflicts, and which turned inclusive nationalist themes increasingly exclusionary. Like in the Soviet Union, the critical actors that brought about its break-up were themselves transformed by the spread of nationalism" (Vladisavljević 2008, 208).

The results of the first multi-party elections showed a clear polarisation of society between those who were nationalist-oriented and those who were citizen-oriented. The opposition leaders and their supporters were an ideologically heterogeneous group (unlike the ruling structure and their voters), including liberal-minded politicians and citizens (such as the Democratic Party – DS), but also nationalists (Serbian Renewal Movement – SPO, Democratic Party of Serbia – DSS etc.) and members of the radical right-wing Serbian Radical Party – SRS, whose attitude towards the regime fluctuated as they did not always support the government (although they were close and even in coalition several times). However, what was constant in the rhetoric of the leaders and members of the SRS was that they did not advocate liberal democracy. The SRS were extreme nationalists (Antonić 2003, 226-229; Antonić 2007, 26).

During the last decade of Yugoslavia, although some intellectuals had nationalist views and rhetoric, the social structure and the ruling structure were pro-Yugoslav oriented. After 1990 the situation dramatically changed. Since the ruling structure (SPS) repeatedly won all elections between until Fall 2000, with the exception of the 1996 local elections, when the first steps towards overthrowing the regime began, which we cannot call fair and free (because they had economic, institutional and media advantage over other competitors), nationalist discourse and ideology remained dominant in the public sphere in Serbia. The elections were so unfair that the opposition boycotted them on several occasions, but that did not stop the ruling elite from continuing to abuse their position (Oko izbora 1997, 109). In late 1996, on the occasion of the local

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elections, mass student and civic demonstrations began on the streets of Serbian cities. The demonstrations were motivated by election theft, but also by the general poor socio-economic situation and the wars that ended. The ruling coalition organised a counter-rally (one protester was killed and another was wounded), but the protesters were extremely persistent and organised multiple protests in Niš, Belgrade and other cities that lasted for months. "We received support from almost the whole world, for example, in France, events in Serbia were reported every 10 minutes, three leaders were guests in the capitals of the EU and the USA, and citizens felt their own power to fight for democratic rights and freedom of assembly and expression. At that time, all the doors of the system were still closed, that is, there was no chance that the government would be overthrown at that time, but that was really the beginning of its end. We learned that good organisation, joint action and mobilisation of citizens have a chance to change the regime of Slobodan Milošević" – said one of the leaders of the then opposition, Vesna Pešić (Danas 2016).

Namely, after the mid-1990s, dissatisfaction with the ruling party intensified. The Serbian government, led by the SPS, believed that the reopening of the country to the world and economic recovery would strengthen their position among the population and voters. Restarting business operations of many foreign companies in Serbia, initiating privatisation and opening borders was not enough to stop the dissatisfaction of some citizens and opposition politicians (Pavlović 2018, 414). Although the results of the election to the Assembly of the FRY (The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and Serbia – the first after the war – did not show the weakening of the ruling party's position, the elections for local assemblies in larger Serbian cities all reflected dissatisfaction with the Milošević regime. The opposition could not agree on a mutual election platform for parliamentary elections and entered the election race in several factions, which led to their failure. However, at the local elections in large industrial centres which were severely affected by the sanctions, the opposition came out united and received great support from the citizens. The government initially did not want to accept the election results, but Milošević faced pressure from the international community and recognised them only after lengthy protests on the streets of Serbian cities. That is why a special OSCE mission was sent to Serbia, headed by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, which reached an agreement with the regime to pass a *lex specialis* recognising the victory of the opposition at the local level (Zundhausen 2008, 553).

However, the beginning of the armed conflict in Kosovo in 1998 led to the re-mobilisation of nationalist forces in Serbia, and consequently to the failure of the opposition in the presidential elections. Milošević also used the Kosovo events to strengthen political dominance at the domestic level by holding a referendum on the participation of foreign representatives in resolving the problems in Kosovo and Metohija in 1998. The complication of the conflict in Kosovo with the involvement of NATO briefly diverted attention from

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internal political issues to the question of the survival of the state and its governing structure. One of the consequences of NATO's action against Serbia was the rise of Euroscepticism and anti-Westernism within the Serbian opposition, which had previously been pro-European. The war against NATO was used by the ruling party to strengthen its position among voters through propaganda. What is more, opposition activities were presented as evidence of their anti-state activities.

In the second part of the last decade of the twentieth century, the regime intensified its populist rhetoric, which implied a radical division into 'us' – nationally and patriotically enlightened and supposedly honest people, and 'them' – members of the opposition that were labelled as 'foreign mercenaries' and 'traitors'. It is particularly important to emphasise this aspect of the development of the Serbian government's populist narrative because it was based on a specific form of nationalism that was no longer motivated only by the hate towards Croats or Bosniaks (i.e. it was not nativist-oriented), but became extremely anti-Western. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 further sharpened the rhetoric in this direction. As regards the pre-election atmosphere (before the elections of September 2000), there were a lot of statements like the one given by Ivan Marković, the then Minister of Telecommunications, who said that "Opposition rivals are an instrument of the West and NATO" and that it was therefore important to defend "the country from betrayal". He also asked the people of Čačak if they would allow Velja Ilić (oppositionist from Čačak) to make Čačak a new Aviano (NATO base in Italy from where the planes that bombed the FRY took off) in Serbia. Marković answered himself: "It is not possible, the people of Čačak will not allow it. It is not Velimir Ilić's Čačak". He said directly that whoever voted for the opposition in Čačak (for Velimir Ilić) voted for the West and NATO. At the same time, Mirjana Marković, Slobodan Milošević's wife, spoke at a pre-election rally about opposition leaders as "advocates of a monster that sows evil in the world." Marković concluded: "In these elections, they are the leaders of the NATO list. Those facts are, of course, unpleasant and difficult, but they are true" (Vujić 2020). In these examples, we can see how populism was heating up, but also how it was gaining a slightly different dimension compared to the first half of the 1990s, when the emphasis was placed on interethnic tensions with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the same time, severe police repression in 1999 and 2000 did not yield results as in the early 1990s, which indicated a shift of power in Serbia. The government's campaign promoting the apparent reconstruction of the country heavily damaged in the bombing was not enough to secure victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 24 September 2000. The elections won by the representative of the opposition, Vojislav Koštunica, were again the subject of irregularities, which is why the election commission announced the second round of elections where two candidates were to compete: Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Koštunica (Pavlović 2018, 419). The opposition did not accept the election results, giving an ultimatum to the ruling

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party to recognise the election victory of their candidate by 5 October (Dimić 2004, 1-18). Thus, the decision-making was transferred from the ballot boxes to the streets, which showed the determination of the ruling structure not to hand over power legally, as well as the determination of the opposition not to agree to compromises that would legalise the criminal actions of the government. However, the last and clear indication that the SPS and Milošević would lose power for the first time since 1990 was the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Belgrade, which enabled a peaceful transfer of power, despite large demonstrations on the streets of Belgrade on 5 October.

If we look at the election campaigns in the period from 1990 to 2000, we will see that the absolute majority of campaigns were centred on national issues. This was especially the case with the SPO, SRS, as well as with the ruling SPS, which, however, combined nationalist rhetoric with issues of economic development and egalitarianism in Serbia. The democratic contingent of opposition parties predominantly used the election campaign to point out the machinations of the government, although nationalist messages could be heard on their part as well. For example, in December 1992, one of the SPS leaders gave an interview to the daily newspaper *Politika* in which he said that the national question was by far the most important issue in Serbia (Slavujević 2007, 112-113; Atlagić 2011, 324-326). This statement was a 'chorus' that resonated across the Serbian political scene in that period. Election slogans provide insight into the dominant messages of the parties: The SPS insisted on a nativist narrative such as that "Serbia will not bend" (alluding to conflicts with other countries), and that "there is no uncertainty" with them (this was used to instigate the fear of economic and political collapse which was allegedly going to happen if the opposition came to power). The SRS said that "Where there are Serbian lands, there are Serbian radicals" (They strived towards the realisation of the so-called "Greater Serbia" project) and the democratic parties called for changes, fair elections, development of civic awareness, and the return of smiles on the faces of citizens (Kojić 2020; Slavujević 2007; Atlagić 2011). Radicals (SRS) remained strong nationalists who kept advocating the idea of "Greater Serbia" even after the wars and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. For example, before the 2000 presidential elections, Šešelj (leader of the SRS) said that people should vote for Nikolić (SRS's candidate) because "he will never give up on the project of uniting all Serbian countries" (Šešelj 2000). This does not mean that there were no nationalists in the 'democratic bloc' as well (we have already said that the DSS and the SPO were nationalists), but they primarily advocated the introduction of democratic institutions, which was the main difference between the regime and opposition parties.

On the other hand, we have seen that before the 2000 elections, the electoral rhetoric of the ruling coalition had focused on the fight against the opposition as alleged traitors to Serbia and the Serbian people. However, we would like to reiterate that it was still a nationalist programme, although different and less nativist

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compared to the beginning of the 1990s (during the wars) and directed towards anti-Western rhetoric. Some parties (such as the aforementioned SRS) retained nativist elements in their propaganda materials, but the SPS and parties gathered around the SPS increasingly directed criticism at the West and the opposition which was allegedly financed by Western governments.

On the example of Serbia, we see how populism, as a 'thin ideology', was easily combined with two ideological conglomerates: with nationalism (to a greater extent) and with egalitarianism (in a smaller and very specific variant – more on that later in the Report). The rhetoric of the elites (especially members of the ruling structures) was nationalistic; however, in line with the goals set at the beginning of the Report, we will now focus on analysing primary and secondary data on the prevalence of these ideologies in Serbian society. In other words, we will analyse the 'answer from below', i.e., acceptance and reproduction of populist rhetoric by wider social strata in Serbia in the period from 1990 to the early 2000s.

In the following paragraphs, we will present empirical data that confirm the widespread prevalence of nationalism and nativism, as well as authoritarianism which is related to these two value orientations. Nativism (which we explained in the first part of the Report – Mudde 2007, 19) was widespread in Serbia at the beginning of multipartyism. It was the fuel for the legitimation of the civil wars that would take place in the coming years in former Yugoslavia. Although research from the 1980s showed a relatively low degree of nationalism among the wider social strata in Serbia (Pantić 1981; Lazić 2005), towards the end of that decade and at the beginning of the new one, nationalism was extremely prevalent and it was an integral part of official policies. "While other Eastern European states largely opted for democracy, Serbia and Yugoslavia's other republics, except for Slovenia, faced the rise of a new authoritarianism. Various struggles, socio-economic and political, at both elite and mass levels were transformed into an intense nationalist conflict, which later resulted in the break-up of Yugoslavia, prolonged (civil) wars in Croatia and Bosnia and the intensification of the Serb-Albanian nationalist conflict that culminated in NATO intervention in 1999. Nationalist mobilisation, earlier largely restricted to the battles over a relatively limited constitutional reform, became increasingly radical, featuring maximalist demands for national self-determination" (Vladisavljević 2008, 210-211).

The following research (Petrović and Radoman 2016; Lazić 2005) shows us the various shades of transition to different value patterns in the early 1990s. In a study conducted in 1989, low scores for nationalism were obtained, however, the lowest scores were those related to interpersonal relationships (such as attitudes on mixed marriages), while the highest scores were those related to the relationship with the entire collective/ethnicity. As previously mentioned, this was a period in which members of another nation became *Others* (in the case of Serbia, the *Others* were Croats and Bosniaks) and they were perceived as the main

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enemies. At the time, responses such as "I have nothing against him personally, but I have against his people" were prevalent. This answer is a good illustration of the growing nationalism that gained full momentum in the first half of the 1990s. At that time, the combination of authoritarianism (inherited from the Yugoslav era), patriarchy and growing nationalism, as a kind of a new phenomenon, was in its infancy (Petrović and Radoman 2016, 166; Lazić 2005, 48-59).

In the next research (Mihailović 1991) we can see how nationalist-oriented citizens were grouping around the ruling options at the beginning of the introduction of multipartyism in Serbia. Exactly 60% of SPS voters had an extremely authoritarian orientation (20% were non-authoritarian and 20% belonged to a mixed model), while only 20% of DS voters had an authoritarian orientation (62% were non-authoritarian and 18% mixed). On the other hand, the so-called strong national orientation was present among supporters of all prominent parties, i.e., SPS, SPO and DS, but the majority of DS supporters belonged to the so-called soft nationalist current (Mihailović 1991, 119-120). Given that these three parties won the first three places at the first elections (with the SPS winning by a landslide), we can conclude that authoritarianism and nationalism were the dominant value orientations of voters in 1990.

Results from the World Values Survey (3rd and 4th wave) are in the line with previously mentioned findings regarding the predominance of nationalist orientation. In the 3rd wave of the Survey (1996), over 80% of respondents said that they were willing to fight for their country, while three quarters of them stated that they were proud of their country (Table 1). It could be argued that nationalism remained dominant in the 4th wave of the survey, since the majority of respondents were willing to fight and were proud of their country. Nonetheless, the number of respondent willing to fight for their country was significantly lower in 2001 ($(X^2(1)> = 36.166$, $p < 0.001$) compared to 1996.

Table 1: Nationalism in Serbia

Time period:	Nationalism			
	Would you be willing to fight for your country?		How proud are you to be a member of your national group?	
3rd wave (1996)	Yes	83.3%	Not at all proud	4.8%
			Not very proud	20%
	No	16.7%	Quite proud	34.5%
			Very proud	40.7%
4th wave (2001)	Yes	72.1%	Not at all proud	6.6%
			Not very proud	18.6%
	No	27.9%	Quite proud	32.9%
			Very proud	42.6%

Source: World Values Survey, waves 3 (1996) and 4 (2001)

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Some recent studies have recorded a decline in nationalism in Serbia after the end of the wars (Janković 2019). If we look at the data from 2002, we will see that nationalism persists among those who are less educated, who belong to lower social strata and who have an authoritarian personality. But what is particularly interesting is that nationalism remains linked to two ideological orientations: socialist conservatism and right-wing conservatism. In other words, nationalism in Serbia is easily combined with the rest of socialist values, among which social justice and class equality are the most permanent. In this research (Todosijević 2103, 287-289), egalitarianism proves to be the most significant predictor of socialist conservatism, which shows that nationalism and egalitarianism are not only interconnected, but also that they form a solid foundation for populist discourses.

As for egalitarianism, which we have mentioned as another important component of populism in former Yugoslavia, the situation in Serbia is somewhat more complex than in the case of nationalism or nativism. Nationalism and nativism were a widespread ideological matrix among the vast majority of the elite and the population of Serbia in the period 1990–2000, but as regards egalitarianism, opinions were divided. It should be recalled that egalitarianism is used as part of a populist narrative that implies the fight against 'corrupt elites' and not as a promotion of socialist ideas. We have already said that anti-communism is an important part of contemporary populist narratives in former Yugoslavia (see also the Report *Conceptualisation of neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism*), but the ideas of social equality and the fight against corruption were an important element of populism in Serbia throughout the whole period 1990–2000.

Due to the specificities of Yugoslav socialism and the existence of a quasi-market economy in socialism, some aspects of the values of economic liberalism were adopted by wider social strata in Serbia while it was still part of Yugoslavia. The collapse of socialism and the transition to capitalism in Serbia was marked by a series of economic crises, 'predatory privatisations' of state-owned companies, 'state capitalism', international isolationism and sanctions. Serbia was hit by hyperinflation – one of the highest ever until the hyperinflation in Venezuela, decrease in wages, and general economic uncertainty, and the situation worsened when the war economy was introduced. In such a chaotic and crisis-infused context, it is logical that contradictory value patterns were present among the voters (Pešić 2017, 246).

We will not delve into the details of the development of the acceptance or rejection of economic liberalism, but we will emphasise that some of the components of liberalism were more accepted than others (private property was an indisputable ideal, while, on the other hand, most citizens advocated the idea of state interventionism). In addition, the middle class and the upper class were more inclined to accept economic liberalism, while the working class leaned towards socialist models and egalitarianism (Pešić 2017, 248-249). However, since the working class mostly voted for the ruling populist SPS, egalitarianism was an important

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constitutive element of the development of populism in Serbia, but it was not as dominant as nationalism. The results of a survey conducted in 1991 showed that only 38% of SPS supporters advocated the idea of private property, while 75% of DS supporters were in favour of private property (Mihailović 1991, 121). In other words, unlike nationalism, which was largely accepted by wider social strata, the upper class was the proponent of economic liberalism, while the lower class advocated the ideas of social protection and social equality. Nonetheless, as we have already said, the strong link between socialist conservatism and nationalism will remain one of the more important components of contemporary populist discourses in Serbia.

Results from the World Values Survey regarding egalitarianism are more ambiguous than the ones regarding nationalism. On the one hand, when it comes to acceptance of inequalities, the mean position of the respondents' is close to the middle of the scale. On the other hand, with regard to acceptance of competition, people are more clearly liberal (Table 2). Finally, it should be noted that acceptance of inequalities was significantly higher in 2001 than it was in 1998 (t(2395)=5,225), while acceptance of competition decreased (t(2209,396)=4,710). This was probably the result of experiencing a specific kind of transition towards capitalism that was characteristic of Serbian society and that created value disorientation.

Table 2: Egalitarianism in Serbia

Time period:	Egalitarianism			
	Income equality vs. income differences		Competition harmful vs. competition good	
3rd wave (1996)	Mean	5.124	Mean	8.071
	Std. Deviation	3.096	Std. Deviation	2.245
4th wave (2001)	Mean	5.776	Mean	7.607
	Std. Deviation	3	Std. Deviation	2.470

Source: World Values Survey, waves 3 (1996) and 4 (2001)

To summarise, Serbia was the last country to organise multi-party elections and the only country where the former structures (unfairly) won the elections. The new regime insisted on nationalist ideology and rhetoric, both through statements in the media and in election campaigns. Slobodan Milošević was a populist leader who successfully fuelled interethnic hatred. He was a good orator and he easily mobilised masses during a series of protests in the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution and in the later period (Vykoupilová and Stojarová, 2008). On the other hand, the general economic crisis created confusion regarding the acceptance of

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capitalism and economic liberal reforms, so one part of the population (especially the lower strata) remained faithful to the socialist ideals of equality. Milošević successfully inherited that sentiment as well (we should remember the election slogans which said that only the SPS guaranteed security and stability). One part of the opposition and opposition-oriented citizens advocated democracy (these were primarily highly educated middle classes in urban areas), while the other part of the opposition also insisted on nationalism (Serbian radicals and the SPO). It should be borne in mind that the period of the nineties in Serbia was marked by the so-called brain drain, i.e. young and mostly highly educated people were leaving the country. In other words, the contingent of those who were in favour of the overthrow of the regime and who advocated modernist and democratic values was shrinking.

2.4.2. Case study – Croatia

A unified League of Communists of Yugoslavia ceased to exist in early 1990, while the first non-communist parties and associations started forming in Croatia a year prior. Although newly established parties promoted various stances and programmes (they included liberals, nationalists, rightists, extreme leftists, traditional Catholics), we will only focus on the ones that are crucial for understanding populism in this country. The democratic changes in Croatia were primarily demanded by 'opposition politicians', intellectuals that included former political prisoners and political dissidents, who were not members of the Party (Barić 2005, 25-36; Goldstein 2008, 688-809; Radelić 2006, 65-96; Ramet 2009, 357-445; Bilandžić 2001, 749-798; Čalic 2019, 251-296). The overall situation in Croatia during the 1990s was a fertile ground for the development of populism and populist movements, particularly of the right-wing tradition. According to Milardović, up until 1989, populism in Croatia had existed in the form of a left-wing populist totalitarian dictatorship, after which it rose as a mass defence movement against the Serbian mass populist movement. Only later did political parties establish at various levels of the political spectrum. More or less, they all strove to appeal to the people. The first polarisation pattern or the first line of conflict (1989–1992) was Croatia–Yugoslavia, where two groups of parties appeared: 1) pro-Croatian and 2) pro-Yugoslav or pro-Serbian parties that advocated the preservation of the Yugoslav–Slavic formation. The second polarisation pattern within Croatia was the division into left-wing parties (the Social Democratic Party – SDP) and centre-right and right-wing parties (the Croatian Democratic Union – HDZ and the Croatian Party of Rights – HSP). The third polarisation pattern (1992–1995) was the one between Croatian ruling parties and Serbian rebels. The forth polarisation pattern and the new line of conflict (1992–1999) was formed between the metropolis and regions. Regionalist parties opposing metropolisation started emerging. The fifth polarisation pattern (1995–1999) was created between work and capital, traditionalism, etc. From 1989 to 1999, around 80 political parties were

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formed in the Republic of Croatia on the grounds of these polarisation patterns and lines of conflict. (Matić 2014, 167-181; Milardović 2004, 146-147)

One of the most important parties for understanding populism in Croatia was the HDZ, which was in power during the first decade of multiparty system in Croatia. As a centre-right party with a vague eclectic programme, the HDZ was founded on 17 June 1989. Franjo Tuđman was named party president, while Dalibor Brozović, Krešimir Balenović and Vladimir Šeks were elected as vice-presidents. Their programme promoted the idea of all-Croatian national reconciliation (see further in the text) , advocating the independence of Croatia, consistent recognition of the Croatian people's historical right to self-determination, secession, and the return and connection of the entire diaspora with the homeland. They further strived to gather various social and political groups around a broad political programme which was supposed to be founded on the ideological traditions of Starčević's Party of Rights, Radić's Peasant Movement, and Croatian statehood movements. Nationalism promoted by the HDZ, although imbued with intolerance and attractive to the Croatians who were politically prone to neo-fascism (especially the returnees from diaspora), was too huge of a conundrum to simply be viewed as the revival of the Ustasha movement. In fact, Tuđman's idea of the reconciliation between the descendants of Ustaše/fascists and Partisans/anti-fascists, and the unity between the Homeland and Émigré Croatia. Several scholars acknowledge that Tuđman's ideas on reconciliation by "forgetting the past" backfired and tolerated the rehabilitation of the Ustaša, rightfully labelling them as "flirting with the Ustaša" (Pavlaković 2008, Đurašković 2016). The first HDZ general assembly, held in February 1990, gathered scores of people from Croatia and diaspora, inspiring the establishment of a mass national movement that adhered to the programme of Croatian state independence, either within the Yugoslav federation or outside of it. The HDZ became the strongest political party at the first multi-party elections. At the second general assembly, held in October 1992, they defined their programme and established themselves as a people's democratic Christian party. The right-wing faction started to exert stronger influence in the party's leadership, promoting the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (the never recognized Croatian- controlled territorial unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina) , which led to escalated conflicts with the international community, prompting certain members, headed by Josip Manolić and Stipe Mesić, to leave the party and establish the Croatian Independent Democrats (HND) in April 1994. The key figure of this party was Franjo Tuđman, who was its president until he died (1989–1999) and three-term president of Croatia (1990–1999) (Veselinović 2016, 71-102; Ramet 2009, 515, 722; Duntov 2010, 387).

Following the wave of democratisation in Eastern Europe, changes ensued within the League of Communists of Croatia, which was politically revived and reformed in late 1990, first as the League of Communists of Croatia – Party of Democratic Change (SKH – SDP), and later, in 1993, as the Social Democratic Party of

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Croatia (SDP). The newly reformed SDP was a centre-left party. The changes in the SDP began in December 1989, when Ivica Račan became the new president of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia. The reformed SDP advocated the idea that Croatia should become a nation-state of the peoples and nations living in it, while they saw Yugoslavia as a federal state union. Their programme demanded political pluralism, transformation of the economy and market from socialist into capitalist, private property, personal freedoms of the individual, and national minority freedoms. In the first elections of 1990, the SDP lost and became the opposition.

In addition to these two parties, many others emerged. One of them that should be mentioned was the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), founded on 25 February 1990, a right-wing party that promoted the idea of nation-state sovereignty on the entire historical and ethnic territory as the "realisation of the centuries-old aspirations of the Croatian people". The HSP can be deemed a party of populist strategy. In the Croatian political arena, the HSP acted as a radical right-wing party with elements such as authoritarianism (even a militant one, having formed a paramilitary unit, HOS – Croatian Defence Forces - that fought in the war in Croatian, and were absorbed into Croatian Armed Forces in 1992), extremely radical nativism (with the slogan "Croatia to the Croats"), anti-communism and neo-fascism. It advocated territorial revisionism, i.e. the expansion of Croatian borders to other states – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro, which was suggested in a programme known as the 'June Charter' (13 June 1991), in which the borders of Greater Croatia included Subotica, Zemun, Drina, Sandžak and Kotor Bay (Veselinović 2018, 250). The HSP advocated the return to the patriarchal values of the Catholic Church and patriarchal way of life, they protested against the proponents of abortion and the negative birth rate with Croatians, which they blamed on emigration and economic status of citizens, as stated in the *HSP Fundamental Principles* of 1991. While the HSP began increasingly identifying with the Ustasha movement after the split and started strengthening their radical and anti-Serbian rhetoric, the HSP – 1861 distanced themselves from the anti-Serbian rhetoric and glorification of Pavelić, although they still promoted Croatian nationalism and anti-communism, maintaining radical criticism against Tuđman. The HSP applied their populist strategy from 1990 to 1999 (the party had two phases: 1990–1993 and 1993–1999). In the political sense, they were on the side of the "united Croatian people" and against the old and the new elites (HDZ). The HSP insisted on the process of cleansing the Croatian nation under the slogan they used in the 1992 election campaign "For clean Croatia, for Croatia without communists, and for Croatia without Serbs-Greater Serbs", advocating assimilation of Serbs and the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church for the Orthodox population (Veselinović, 2018, 251). In the first phase (1990–1993), the HSP maintained radical criticism against Tuđman and his government, which condemned their policy, particularly the Ustasha nostalgia. The second phase from 1993 to 1999 ensued after

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the split and the change in HSP leadership. In this phase, the HSP's criticism of Tuđman was lacking, while Tuđman himself was also more tolerant towards the HSP, even though the Ustasha nostalgia, radical Croatian nationalism and strong anti-Serbian rhetoric were still the main elements of the HSP's ideology (Veselinović 2016, 71-102; Veselinović 2018, 243-279). In addition to the HSP, the institution that actively promoted traditional values was the Croatian Population Movement of Don Anto Baković, a xenophobic and homophobic organisation dedicated to encouraging Croatian Catholics to procreate as much as possible (Ramet 2009, 726).

In February 1990, the Croatian Parliament adopted a series of legal acts ensuring free association of citizens into various organisations, which resulted in the holding of the first multi-party elections in April and May 1990. A large number of parties (33) participated in the 1990 elections, where the HDZ, led by Franjo Tuđman, and the League of Communists of Croatia – Party of Democratic Change (SKH – SDP) were the strongest. The HDZ won with 42.3% of votes, gaining 205 out of 356 seats in the Parliament. They were followed by SKH – SDP with 35.3%. The Serb Democratic Party (SDS) also passed the electoral threshold with 1.6% and 5 seats (Afrić, Ujević, 1990, 11-34). Soon after the elections, the Parliament adopted constitutional amendments and names, by which the republic was renamed the Republic of Croatia, socialist terminology was removed from its bodies, and socialist symbols on the coat of arms and flag were abandoned. The new Constitution, often referred to as the 'Christmas Constitution', was adopted on 22 December 1990, defining Croatia as a sovereign state of the Croatian people and its citizens belonging to other nations and minorities, a state of parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and market economy. On 21 February 1991, the Croatian Parliament enacted a resolution on the process of disassociation from the SFRY, and on 19 May the Croatian independence referendum was held. The turnout was 83.56%, with 93.24% of voters in favour of a sovereign and independent Croatia. Upon taking office, Tuđman wanted to build bridges not only with Croats of all political orientations, but also with Serbs in Croatia; consequently, he offered the position of one of deputy prime ministers to Jovan Rašković, representative of Serbs in Croatia, which Rašković refused, boycotting the Parliament and forming his own (secessionist) parliament.

The process of disassociation of Croatia from the SFRY is crucial for understanding the context in which populism developed. Serbs in Croatia believed they had the right to secede, or even take up arms if Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia. This process was spearheaded by the Serb Democratic Party, founded on 17 February 1990 in Knin with Jovan Rašković as its leader. On 25 July 1990, the Serb Assembly in Srb, Croatia, adopted the *Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serbian Nation in Croatia*, and in July and August 1990 Serbs in Croatia began setting up barricades and roadblocks in North Dalmatia, Lika, Banovina and other parts of the country (this process was called the "Log Revolution"). From 29 August

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to 2 September 1990, a referendum on the autonomy of Serbian people in Croatia was held, and towards the end of the year the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina was founded, resulting in a conflict between the Croatian authorities and Serbs. Croatian Serbs were outraged because the Croatian authorities denied them administrative autonomy, because they would be fired from the police force for refusing to sign a declaration of loyalty to Croatia after the HDZ came into power, because the kuna was introduced as the official currency and the checkerboard was used as the coat of arms, and because of the selective interpretation of the NDH by Tuđman's government (Ramet 2009, 476-477, 720; Barić 2005, 68-70, Calic 2019, 297-300).

The first half of 1991 saw a rising number of skirmishes between the armed ethinc Serbs (Pakrac, Plitvice, Borovo Selo) and Croatian police forces; however, the conflict did not escalate significantly until summer. After holding the referendum (19 May 1991), the Croatian Parliament convened from 18 to 25 June 1991, and on 25 June 1991, in coordination with the Slovenian Parliament, promulgated the *Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia* and the *Declaration on the Proclamation of the Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia*, and then initiated the processes of disassociation and international recognition. In agreement with the representatives of the European Community, on 7 July 1991 on the Brijuni Islands, Croatian and Slovenian leadership agreed to suspend the constitutional decisions on disassociation for a period of three months so as to resolve the crisis in a peaceful manner; however, the war grew in intensity. From the summer of 1991, Croatia was engulfed in war (in Croatia, the 1991–1995 war is officially referred to as *the Homeland War*), with the country being attacked from Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as from its own territories with a Serbian majority population, by various volunteer paramilitary organisations. The main task of the Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslavenska narodna armija – JNA) was "to protect Serbian people in Croatia and liberate in every sense all areas with the majority Serbian population from the presence of the Croatian military and Croatian authority" (Kadijević 1993, 124; Ramet 2009, 486).

Conflicts escalated in the area of the so-called Serbian Krajina and Slavonia. War spread quickly, and heavy artillery with the support of the JNA (The Yugoslav People's Army), which was under Serbian supervision, attacked various targets – the towns of Vinkovci, Vukovar, Glina, Tenja, Petrinja and Osijek. The Dalmatian coast was not spared either. The agreement on unconditional ceasefire between the Republic of Croatia and the JNA (Sarajevo Agreement, 2 January 1992) was signed in the presence of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance. Both belligerents agreed to remain at the territories they had taken. With the Sarajevo Agreement coming into effect, the first stage of the war in Croatia ended, giving way to the stage of "neither war nor peace", i.e. a low-intensity conflict, which brought about the deployment of UN

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peacekeeping forces along the ceasefire line; this stage would last from January 1992 until the end of 1994 and into 1995 (Marijan, 2006, 97-192; Barić, 2006, 191-289). The brunt of the war moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina, sparking the "all-out bloody Balkan war". The territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was claimed by all, both Serbian and Croatian politicians; some did it publicly, others in informal conversations. During the war (1991–1995), a third of Croatian territory was occupied. Operations with the objective of liberating these territories commenced in 1993 with Operation Maslenica. The Croatian Army liberated the Zadar hinterland and enabled uninterrupted communication with Dalmatia, while Operation Medak Pocket freed the region in the vicinity of the town of Gospić. In 1994, military operations began, which lasted until the end of 1995. Operations Flash (May 1995, liberation of Western Slavonia) and Storm (August 1995, disbandment of the Republic of Serbian Krajina) liberated the majority of the occupied areas. (Marijan 2006, 97-192; Barić 2006, 191-289). The operation Flash and Storm resulted in ethnic cleansing that later led to the prosecution of Croatian generals in charge of those operations by the ICTY, who were eventually acquitted (see further in the text). Operation Storm was followed by a cycle of joint operations by the Croatian Army, HVO and Army of BiH in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which led to the signing of the Dayton / Paris Peace Agreement on 14 December 1995. The Croatian Podunavlje (Eastern Slavonia) remained under the protection of UN forces, and the Erdut Agreement of November 1995 allowed for the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into the Republic of Croatia, which was finalised in January 1998 (Barić 2005, 25-36; Goldstein 2008, 688-809).

As mentioned in the conceptual part of this report, during the wars in Yugoslavia, members of other ethnicities or religions became 'others', which is crucial for the binary logic of populism (i.e. the division into 'us' and 'them'). Therefore, bearing in mind these ethnic conflicts, it is no surprise that the period until 2000 was characterised by the rule of parties with nationalist rhetoric, namely the HDZ. After winning the 1990 election, the HDZ headed the Government of National Unity (17 July 1991 – 12 August 1992), which was formed during the war by representatives of all parties in the Parliament and experts. It organised defence, took care of refugees, ensured monetary independence and won Croatia's international recognition. In the 1992 and 1995 elections, the HDZ again won the most seats and formed the government without a coalition. It should be mentioned that third parliamentary elections were held on 29 October 1995, a year earlier than planned, because the HDZ and President Tuđman were eager to take advantage of the national euphoria following Operation Storm. The power of the HDZ started to wane as members of the party and government faced charges of irregularities in the privatisation process, restriction of media freedom and international isolation. Consequently, after the death of F. Tuđman in December 1999, on 3 January 2000, the HDZ lost in the election for the House of Representatives and became the opposition. By the year 2000, there were three presidential elections in the Republic of Croatia. In the first election in 1992, Franjo Tuđman won in

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the first round with 56.73%. In the second election in 1997, F. Tuđman won again, securing his term in the first round with 61.41%. After Tuđman's death in late 1999, the third presidential election was held in 2000, where Stjepan Mesić won in the second round. The rule of F. Tuđman and HDZ were filled with controversy. Some compare Tuđman's rule to out-dated dictatorial policies, since his politics used the levers of power for the glorification of himself, his family, friends and the party, while some claim he committed electoral fraud and used security and intelligence services for his own aims (Ramet 2009, 719). Soon after the HDZ lost power, the first indictments started coming from The Hague for certain prominent Croatian generals in operations Flash, Storm and Medak Pocket.

The period of the 1990s was characterised by war and the rule of right-oriented politicians with strong nationalist narratives. In this context, the rise of nationalism among common people was not surprising. The prevalence of nationalism in Croatia had a different dynamic and distribution compared to Serbia. If we look at the results obtained in 1989, we will see that in Serbia there were higher scores for nationalism than in Croatia. Although the 1989 results indicated a majority non-nationalist orientation in both societies, this does not mean that there were no differences between them, and it should also be kept in mind that the situation would change drastically in the following years. Due to the complex contextual framework that determines the emergence and prevalence of nationalism, it is clear that the interpretation of these findings cannot be unambiguous. At the macro-social level, a somewhat higher degree of nationalist orientation in Serbia stemmed from the fact that the nationalist ideological matrix represented a new ideological foundation of the Serbian republican leadership (this topic has already been discussed in the previous case study). In Croatia, the nationalist movement was represented by intellectuals and dissidents. Therefore, it can be concluded that nationalism was more slowly accepted among wider social strata in Croatia than in Serbia. On the other hand, a somewhat higher degree of ethnic heterogeneity in Croatia, and a stronger expression of close interethnic ties and reduced cultural distance, caused Croatian citizens to be more cautious towards nationalist rhetoric (Pešić 2016, 504).

A significant increase in nationalism was recorded in Croatia a year after the end of the war. This resulted in a transition from the non-nationalist to the nationalist orientation (the average score in 1996 rose to 3.46 on the scale from 1 to 5), which is explained as a consequence of ethnic conflicts and war in Croatia. After that, nationalism gradually declined and in 2010 remained at an average score of 3.28 (Janković 2019, 103). The fact that nationalism was a widespread ideology in the mid-1990s is also evidenced by the World Values Survey data. Unfortunately, Croatia did not participate in the 4th wave of the World Values Survey, so the results obtained in the mid-1990s cannot be compared to the ones from the end of the decade, but we can analyse the data from 3rd wave and compare them with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Results from

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the World Values Survey (3rd wave) show that nationalism was dominant in Croatia in the mid-1990s. As shown in Table 3, almost four fifths of respondents were willing to fight for their country and were proud of their nation. We received similar data in Serbia so we can conclude that nationalism was a widely spread ideological and value orientation in both countries.

Table 3: Nationalism in Croatia

Time period:	Nationalism			
	Would you be willing to fight for your country?		How proud are you to be a member of your national group?	
3rd wave (1996)	Yes	79.5%	Not at all proud	3.3%
			Not very proud	14.8%
	No	20.5%	Quite proud	36.9%
			Very proud	45%

Source: World Values Survey, wave 3 (1996)

If we observe the situation in 2003, we will see that nationalism in Croatia was still at a high level, but we cannot say that it was a dominant value orientation. Despite the increase, the average results on the scale of nationalism did not exceed the limit of the majority nationalist orientation. Wars and outstanding national issues and rhetoric strongly influenced the increase in the prevalence of nationalist orientation in Croatia, but not enough for it to become the majority value orientation – the average score on the nationalist orientation scale was still below the theoretical average. The decline in the share of extremely nationalist-oriented respondents can be explained by the fact that, due to direct or indirect negative experiences in interethnic conflicts, respondents were unwilling to fully agree with attitudes that could potentially contribute to tensions with other ethnic groups (Pešić 2016, 506-507). But unlike in Serbia, the decline in nationalism in Croatia was milder after 2000 (Janković 2019, 103), which is a logical result if we take into account the radical political changes that took place in Serbia in October 2000. In other words, nationalism was extremely present in both countries during the 1990s (at almost the same level of representation), but there were two main differences: in Serbia, nationalism was detected earlier than in Croatia (as early as the late 1980s), but after 2000, nationalism was more prevalent in Croatia than in Serbia.

If, for example, we compare only the working and lower classes (which are the dominant bearers of nationalism in both Serbia and Croatia), we will see that there were significant differences. We may note that the 'nationalist bloc' was dominant in Croatia in both categories of workers, and only among unskilled workers in Serbia. What is more, in Croatia, skilled workers, substantially more than their unskilled colleagues,

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supported the 'civic-democratic bloc' (Lazić and Cvejić 2010, 19). In other words, while nationalism was declining in Serbia in the early 2000s, it remained consistent in Croatia, especially among the lower (working) classes.

As regards the egalitarian value orientation, as we have already said, the collapse of socialism was marked by confusion about economic liberalism. In both Croatia and Serbia, citizens supported radical social and economic changes, such as privatisation and the introduction of a liberal market, but they still believed that state interventionism was good for the state and society. If we compare Croatia and Serbia, we will see that economic liberalism was more accepted in Croatia. This is especially evident from the results obtained in 2003. Due to different contexts and economic development during the 1990s, the spectrum of values of economic liberalism was more accepted in Croatia than in Serbia (Pešić 2017, 248). However, in Croatia too, variables such as class, education and occupation played an important role in the difference in the level of acceptance of economic liberalism. While the highly educated, experts, and entrepreneurs embraced economic liberals, the lower classes continued to advocate equalisation and state interventionism. If we keep in mind that nationalism in Croatia was also a predominant ideology orientation in the working class (Lazić and Cvejić 2010, 19), we can conclude that the ideological mix of egalitarianism and nationalism was the basis for the development of populism in Croatia, although to a lesser extent than in Serbia because the degree of acceptance of economic liberalism was higher in Croatia.

As we have mentioned, unfortunately we do not have data on Croatia from the 4th wave of the World Values Survey but based on the data obtained in the 3rd wave, we can confirm the previous generalizations. Concerning egalitarianism, respondents were more liberal than egalitarian regarding the acceptance of competition, while in terms of income equality, it could be argued that they were undecided, since the average for Croatia was almost identical to the middle point of the scale (Table 4). Class equality, i.e., egalitarianism was one of the most important ideological matrices in Croatia, especially among the lower strata of the population.

Table 4: Egalitarianism in Croatia

Time period:	Egalitarianism			
	Income equality VS income differences		Competition harmful VS competition good	
3rd wave (1996)	Mean	5.003	Mean	8.093
	Std. Deviation	2.8	Std. Deviation	2.1

Source: World Values Survey

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To summarise, the first multi-party elections in Croatia were held in the spring of 1990 and the right-oriented HDZ won the majority of the seats in the Parliament. Soon after the elections, the disassociation process started. At the beginning of 1991, the Croatian Parliament enacted a resolution on the process of disassociation from the SFRY and in May the independence referendum was held. The following years were marked by ethnic tensions and war that lasted until 1995, and UN troops remained in some parts of Croatia until 1998, when the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia and Srijem took place. In this social context, the most dominant parties were the ones that used nationalist rhetoric. Although various political parties criticised corrupt elites (first communist elites, later ruling party elites), egalitarianism was less noticeable than nationalism. Consequently, during the 1990s nationalism grew and became the dominant orientation among common people in Croatia. In a way, a high level of nationalism correlated with an equilibrium between supply and demand (in both populist narratives and value orientations of people). At the same time, with regard to egalitarianism (as the opposite of economic liberalism), it could be argued that people were confused. It is possible that critics of communist elites and communist era were pushing people away from accepting egalitarian values, while meaningful elaboration of its alternative (liberalism) was lacking in political narratives.

2.4.3. Case study – Bosnia and Herzegovina

At the first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, held on 18 November 1990, three national parties, representing the three main ethnicities in the republic, topped the polls, reflecting the ethnic and religious complexities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, Croats backed the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina), Muslims supported the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), while Serbs voted for the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) (Dejanović 1994, 52-53). These three parties won 84% of the seats in the first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their power has not waned significantly to this day (Pejanović 2013, 44).

The SDA ran as a Yugoslav Muslim party, with an insincere and complicated programme of quasi-civic background. Although in certain parts of the party documents the SDA apparently insisted on building the civil society, in practice it the most momentum among voters by appealing to their religious affiliation. Among other things, this party emphasised ‘the endangerment of the Muslim people’, ‘revival of the national consciousness of Muslims’, ‘research and elimination of the causes of the lag in the development of Muslim communities’, as well as strengthening of the national consciousness. The opinion that the party would not advocate the strengthening of civic consciousness in practice stemmed from a large number of provisions

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that were aimed at strengthening religion, more precisely at 'national and religious issues' (Dejanović 2017, 80 – 81).

The Serb Democratic Party (SDS) is a Serbian national right-wing party, which was founded during the SFRY. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SDS was founded in July 1990, and soon after, it became the main representative of the Serbian people. In addition to inviting Serbs to boycott the referendum on Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence, it also declared some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Serb autonomous regions. Among other things, the SDS "denounced all Serbian communists who did not want to leave the League of Communists as bad Serbs" (Žilović 2013, 9-11).

Since its establishment in August 1990, the HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina has remained the dominant political party of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the state, entity, cantonal and local levels (Dejanović 2017, 97). Since the very beginning, this party has been nothing but a branch of the Croatian HDZ. As a result, during the 1990s, the HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina was not loyal to the Bosnian state but to its own home party in Croatia (Nikić Čakar 2011, 56-57). The rhetoric of the early 1990s left no room for doubt as to how the party's policy would be conducted. At one of the first rallies of the HDZ BiH, the following words were heard from the stage: "We should have the same love for the Republic of Croatia as for the country we live in. We should respect and love Zagreb as the city of our homeland and as the capital of all Croats who are anywhere on this globe. We are scattered all over the world. There are about four million emigrated Croats. We adore Sarajevo, but in Sarajevo in 1910 there were 35% of Croats, and today only 8% of us are there. If there were freedom and equality, we would not emigrate like that. That is why the Croatian Democratic Union promotes a particularly strong fight for equality in its programme. If we are to live together here in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must all have the same rights and the same freedoms. We will fight for it!" (Nikić Čakar 2011, 59).

In the 1990 pre-election campaign, the SDS tried to gather the Serbian population under its wing in any possible way. An impressive statement was that "the Serbian people will pay any price to stay in the common state" and that they could not afford to lose after 200 years of fighting for the Serbian state. In the 1990 election campaign, the SDS leadership was particularly successful in winning votes in rural parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Serbs were the majority (Mahić 2008, 18-19).

The SDA constantly advocated a policy of Muslim distrust of other nations. Namely, during a political rally in Foča, before the first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the security team of SDA leader Alija Izetbegović surveilled the surrounding hills, because the news spread "that some crazy sniper wants to kill the SDA leader". At the same rally, news was spread among the electrified participants that Serbs stoned a bus that

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left Turkey in support of the SDA in the elections. The bus was allegedly in Goražde at the time, under repair. The spread of false news continued during the elections, which led to numerous fights and casualties (Nedelkovski 1992, 167).

In the 1990 election campaign, the HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina strived to convince Croats of the danger allegedly posed by Muslims and Serbs. Before the elections, the Islamic Declaration of Alija Izetbegović was updated again, as proof of his intentions (Zukić 2012, 51). Among the numerous nationalist postulates in the election campaign, this party advocated the realisation of the territorial unity of the Croatian people, while their particular goals included the protection of the Croatian people across Bosnia and Herzegovina and the exercise of the right to "self-determination and statehood, independence and sovereignty in Bosnia and Herzegovina." (Nikić Čakar 2011, 63).

The political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been complex since the collapse of communism, and such have been the policies and activities of these three parties. Although, at first glance, they come from the same nationalist pot, their background is different. The HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterised by the fact that it acts as a branch of the HDZ, which, among other things, shapes its policy and changes its leadership. The SDS has built a reputation as the most Serbian party in the Balkans, which is not controlled by anyone (unlike the HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina which is run by the HDZ) and which has no religious but civic background. However, what characterises these parties is the nationalist background, the spread of distrust towards other nations and the tendency to impose the opinion that only they are the pillars of freedom for their own people. In other words, all three parties based their rhetoric not only on the nationalist, but also on the nativist programme.

In the elections of 18 November 1990, the three national parties secured a clear-cut victory in all three nations. Namely, the Croat members of the Presidency were elected from the ranks of the HDZ, the Muslim members were elected from the SDA, while the Serb delegates in the Presidency were elected from the ranks of the SDS. The supranational policy of communism was defeated, and Yugoslavia was on the brink of war (Meier 2005, 192-193).

Undisguised nationalism and mutual threats coming from all three sides indicated the disaster that would reach its peak during the 1992–1995 civil war. Excessive insistence on nationalism on all three sides, disrespect for other ethnicities and threats of war soon escalated into a bloody civil war, which ended three years later with the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Parties that fuelled hatred among citizens, allegedly protecting the interests of their own ethnic group, have remained sovereign on the political scene for decades by using nationalist rhetoric as needed.

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The campaign for the first multi-party elections was conducted in the spirit of open nationalism and threats. Izetbegović constantly repeated that the Muslims would "defend Bosnia with weapons", and that the choice was reduced to two possibilities: a civil republic or a civil war. Stjepan Kljuić presented data on the vulnerability of Croats in BiH and emphasised "the right of Croats to elect their own representatives". The Serbian side referred to Serbian victims from the Second World War and famous national history figures. Radovan Karadžić presented the SDS as a social democratic party. His campaign is famously remembered for the sentence: "Serbs, despite all the persecution, massacres, pressures and sufferings, you still exist and are allowed to be Serbs" (Lučić 2008, 110-111).

Over the course of 1991, under the strong influence of separatism in Slovenia and Croatia, separatist tendencies started emerging in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. On the one hand, Muslims and Croats soon began advocating the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was proclaimed on 18 November 1991. In response, the Serb side declared the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 January 1992. On 1 March 1992, the Muslim and Croat sides held a referendum on independence (Logos 2019, 127-142, 145-165). At its session of 6 April held in Luxembourg, the European Community recognised the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The very next day, on 7 April, the Assembly of the Serbian People in Banja Luka declared the independence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Biserko 2006, 26-33).

In March 1992, a number of interethnic incidents took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In April, members of the police force of the Federal Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina mostly left their posts to join the national militias of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Soon, Sarajevo was ethnically divided in a way that the central part of Sarajevo was in the hands of Muslims, while the outer parts of the city were controlled by Serbs. Soon after the barricades were set up the fighting began, turning the conflict into the so-called "Siege of Sarajevo". At the same time, fighting erupted in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim of the war was to create ethnically clean territories, which led all three ethnic groups to expel militarily subordinated or minority peoples and form camps for prisoners of war and civilians. This interethnic conflict lasted for 20 months, until the beginning of 1994. As a result, the war in Bosnia turned into a triple civil war, where everyone fought against everyone (Logos 2019, 157-165, 168-181, 189-190).

During the summer of 1992, international players became more significantly involved in the conflict, trying to resolve the situation. To this end, Great Britain, as the presidency of the United Nations, convened a peace conference in London, with David Owen and Cyrus Vance as co-presidents (Biserko 2006, 45). Their attempt to resolve the dispute and stop the civil war in early 1993 resulted in the "Vance–Owen Peace Plan".

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According to this plan, Bosnia and Herzegovina was to remain unitary and divided into a total of ten autonomous provinces. Although Muslims and Croats accepted the agreement, the Serbs rejected it, making this attempt to end the war operations unsuccessful (Burg and Shoup 2000, 214-250). The next attempt at mediation was the "Owen–Stoltenberg Plan", which was adopted on 30 July 1993. According to this plan, three constituent units with three constituent peoples were to be formed within Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, this plan failed due to the rejection by Alija Izetbegović (Logos 2019, 206-207).

In the second half of 1993, the Muslim–Croat conflict escalated in Bosnia and Herzegovina and resulted in mass killings and persecution in many places. However, under pressure from the United States, Croatia had to suspend its support to the Croat army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, on 18 March 1994, Alija Izetbegović and Franjo Tuđman signed an agreement on the creation of a Muslim–Croat federation within Bosnia and Herzegovina (Biserko 2006, 84-85). This agreement served as the basis for changing the general direction of the solution policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina – the new plan would include two constituent units – the Serb and the Muslim–Croat. During the summer of the same year, the Contact Group proposed a plan under which 51% of Bosnia and Herzegovina's territory would belong to the Muslim–Croat federation and 49% to the Serbs. However, the Republic of Srpska held a referendum where the plan was rejected by an overwhelming majority. The Serbian people rejected this offer on the grounds that, in that case, they would have to cede a large part of territories that were under the control of the Army of the Republic of Srpska (Logos 2019, 225-230).

In the final year of the war, in mid-July 1995, genocide was committed in Srebrenica. In the late summer of 1995, peace negotiations were launched. In early September, the Republic of Srpska was accepted as the other party to the negotiations, along with the Federation, which was a significant step towards achieving peace. A truce was declared on 5 October, and after the negotiations that lasted a total of three weeks, the final peace agreement was signed on 21 November 1995, at the US military base Dayton (Biserko 2006, 99-102).

After the war, the ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina changed significantly. In order to prepare for the trial of Slobodan Milošević, a special commission analysed changes in 47 municipalities, based on the 1991 census and the 1997/8 electoral roll. The commission first found that 87% of people who fled abroad in 1991 did not return to Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war ended. The analysis showed that, in 1991, 198,246 Serbs lived on the territory of the post-war Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while according to the 1997/8 electoral roll only 10,625 remained, which implies that the percentage dropped from 28% to a total of 3.3%. On the other hand, a total of 344,803 Muslims lived on the territory of the post-war Republic of Srpska in 1991, while in 1997/8 only 7,933 were registered to vote. This means that the percentage

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plummeted from 31.5% to 1.4%. Moreover, the multi-ethnic character these entities had in 1991 drastically changed in 1997/8, when Serbs represented 91.3% of the entire population of the Republic of Srpska, while Muslims and Croats comprised 89.2% of the total population of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tabeu, Zoltkowski, Bijak and Hetland 2003, 835-843).

In addition to such radical demographic changes, there were a number of other problems in the post-war society, including the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons, victims of sexual violence in war, compensation for victims of war destruction and their property, and certain types of appeasing war victims with public apologies, official statements, honours and commemorations (Post-war justice and lasting peace in former Yugoslavia: 19-30). Moreover, the political system as organised under the Dayton Accords soon showed its weaknesses and almost completely disenfranchised national minorities (Collateral Damage to the Dayton Customs Agreement: Discrimination against Minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 4-16).

In the first post-war elections held in 1996, the three hitherto strongest political parties of the constituent peoples reaffirmed their leadership position. The SDA won 45.24% of the vote, while the SDS won 21.4% and the HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina 19.05%, which made up 86.14% of the total votes. Therefore, these three nationally determined political parties fully retained their dominant place in the political arena of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hadžić and Omerbegović 2019, 224).

The following general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina were organised less than two years after the first post-war elections. Thus, in 1998, the first significant changes took place on the political scene. Namely, the results of the elections for the Presidency once again reaffirmed the victory of the SDA's Alija Izetbegović and the HDZ's Ante Jelavić. However, in the election for the Croatian member of the Presidency, the Social Democratic Party of BiH emerged as a prominent player, whose representative received 113,961 votes compared to 189,438 received by the HDZ representative. On the other hand, in the election for the Serbian member of the Presidency, the then dominant SDS was defeated. Živko Radišić won as leader of the Coalition of Sloga with 359,937 votes, compared to 314,236 votes for the former member of the Presidency, Momčilo Krajišnik from the SDS (http://izbori.ba/Default.aspx?CategoryID=223andLang=3).

What is more, the 2000 general elections brought a much more serious change to the political scene in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, in the Federation of BiH, in addition to the SDA and the HDZ, two parties appeared that achieved noticeable results – the Social Democratic Party of BiH, which narrowly won the elections, and the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which achieved the fourth best result. On the other hand, in the Republic of Srpska, the traditional SDS secured a convincing victory this time, but a number of different and promising parties emerged – the Party of Democratic Progress, the Party of Independent Social

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Democrats, the Socialist Party, as well as the SDA and the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (http://izbori.ba/Default.aspx?CategoryID=224andLang=3).

Finally, we would like to present several studies that have been conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before we begin with the analysis of empirical research, two remarks should be kept in mind: first, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, nationalism and nativism have been much more researched than the social and economic value orientations, such as egalitarianism, attitudes towards communism, economic liberalism and capitalism. Second, research conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina often has a comparative character (comparison with the situation in Croatia and Serbia).

National differences in understanding the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and thus the Bosniak nation) began to surface as early as in late 1991. For example, one study (Goati 1991, 113) showed that Serbian and Croatian students in Bosnia and Herzegovina thought that Bosnia would not be able to survive outside the common state, i.e. outside Yugoslavia (78.14% of Serbs and 71.32% of Croats said that Bosnia could not survive as an independent state), while the majority of Bosniak students considered that it was possible for Bosnia to be an independent state (61.33% of Muslims said that Bosnia could survive as an independent state).

If we look at the research conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the middle of the decade, we will see that nationalism and nativism were very common value orientations. One study (Lučić 1997 according to: Puhalo 2007) showed that Serbs from Serbian Sarajevo were most socially distanced from Muslims and Croats, less from Americans and Russians, and least from Serbs from Serbia. The degree of ethnic distance was related to several indicators: age of the respondents (younger ones distanced themselves less than older ones); education of the father (smaller distance was shown by those whose father had finished secondary school or university); the importance attached to national affiliation (those who attached more importance to their national affiliation distanced themselves more); and, authoritarian personality syndrome (respondents who were more authoritarian distanced themselves more). The explicit rejection of Muslims and Croats suggested the existence of ethnocentrism. They perceived their own nation as extremely famous, significant and prominent, and other nations as different, foreign and hostile.

Another study was conducted on a sample of young Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which showed similar tendencies towards high prevalence of nationalism and nativism (Trujačanin 1999 according to: Puhalo 2007). The survey was conducted in November 1999 in Banja Luka, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Derventa and Doboj. The subject of the study was the ethnic distance elementary, secondary school and university students expressed towards certain nations whose soldiers are part of the SFOR, and towards some nations from the

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territory of former Yugoslavia. The results showed that the respondents mostly rejected relations with Albanians, followed by the Roma, Bosniaks, Germans, Croats, Americans, and the English, while they rejected Russians the least. The acceptance of Serbs was almost 100%. Elementary school students showed the least acceptance of relationships with members of other nations, followed by secondary school students, while university students were the most open, i.e. the least distant. Interestingly enough, nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina started declining after the end of the wars. According to the 2002 survey, the greatest ethnic distance was expressed towards the Roma and Albanians, not Serbs, Croats or Bosniaks. Nevertheless, while the highest tolerance was demonstrated towards the idea of living together, ethnically mixed marriages were the least accepted. The results showed that Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were much more willing to live next to each other than with each other. Rejecting any intimate relationship with a member of another nation clearly indicated how much these three nations were divided among themselves. "Attempts to establish close relations with a member of another nation in these areas will be met with condemnation, contempt and rejection" (Puhalo 2007).

As expected, nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina was most prevalent among the lowest classes and it grew with the respondents' age. Furthermore, as in the case of Serbia, nationalism occurred much more often at the level of relations with other peoples in general, than in the case of interpersonal relations. So-called abstract nationalism (towards Serbia or Croatia as a whole) was more prevalent than nationalism towards a specific person – a neighbour, colleague or a friend (Janković 2019, 101).

Finally, data collected in the 3rd and 4th wave of the World Values Survey can supplement these findings. Not only can they serve as a basis for comparing the levels of nationalism in two periods (the mid-1990s and the early 2000s), but they can also, to a certain extent, help us understand the acceptance of egalitarianism. Just like in the previous two studies, we used the same two questions to measure nationalism and two questions to measure egalitarianism (i.e. economic liberalism as its opposite). With regard to nationalism, the 3rd wave of the Survey (1998) showed that over four fifths of respondents said that they were willing to fight for their country, while over 85% of them stated that they were proud of their country (Table 5). Although it could be argued that nationalism remained dominant in 2001, it should be underlined that at this stage a significantly smaller number of people were proud of their country ($X^2(3) = 129.508$, $p < 0.001$), or willing to fight for it ($X^2(1) = 17.743$, $p < 0.001$).

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Table 5: Nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Time period:	Nationalism			
	Would you be willing to fight for your country?		How proud are you to be a member of your national group?	
3rd wave (1998)	Yes	82.1 %	Not at all proud	2.5 %
			Not very proud	11 %
	No	17.9 %	Quite proud	30.1 %
			Very proud	56.4 %
4th wave (2001)	Yes	74.3 %	Not at all proud	8.8 %
			Not very proud	22.4 %
	No	25.7 %	Quite proud	31.2 %
			Very proud	37.6 %

Source: World Values Survey, waves 3 (1996) and 4 (2001)

Results regarding egalitarianism are extremely useful, since, as previously mentioned, most of the studies dealing with Bosnia and Herzegovina are focused solely on nationalism. Unlike with nationalism, data regarding egalitarianism were more ambiguous. Although it could be argued that people in Bosnia and Herzegovina were more liberal than egalitarian, results regarding acceptance of inequalities were close to the middle of the scale. When it comes to acceptance of competition, people were more clearly liberal (Table 6). Finally, it should be noted that acceptance of inequalities was significantly higher in 2001 than it was in 1998 ($t(2388)=5.733$), while there were no significant differences in acceptance of competition between the two periods.

Table 6: Egalitarianism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Time period:	Egalitarianism			
	Income equality VS income differences		Competition harmful VS competition good	
3rd wave (1998)	Mean	5.496	Mean	8.071
	Std. Deviation	2.574	Std. Deviation	1.965
4th wave (2001)	Mean	6.103	Mean	7.947
	Std. Deviation	2.604	Std. Deviation	2.147

Source: World Values Survey, waves 3 (1996) and 4 (2001)

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To summarise, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, wider social strata showed significant support for traditional national parties, which, despite the destruction of war and unfulfilled promises, managed to hold on to the core of their electorate. However, dissatisfaction with their policy began to accumulate significantly at the beginning of the 21st century, which consequently led to the formation of many political parties that had different ideas and appealed to the dissatisfied electorate. As regards the period 1990–2000, it is clear that populism coloured by nationalism was dominant in both 'supply' and 'demand' (to use the terms from our Conceptual Framework). Nationalism was especially prevalent until the end of the war. In the second half of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000, we recorded a slight decline in nationalism; however, nationalism and nativism remained widespread value orientations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unlike in Croatia and particularly Serbia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, egalitarianism did not play a significant role (nationalism and nativism were more important), although citizens were pleading for greater social equality.

2.4.4 An overview of populism in the post-Yugoslav space in the 21st century

In 2000s nationalism and nativism as populist strategies in the three countries analysed in this report became more intense than before. In the subsequent period in Serbia there was a sharp turn away from at least nominal leftism (epitomized by Milošević's Socialist Party) with an initial liberalization and a strong turn towards European orientation represented by the Serbian Prime Minister Đinđić, abruptly stopped by his assassination in 2003, which lead to the rise of right-wing and nationalist forces. The support for right-wing and nationalist populism increased for the several reasons. The first reason was the NATO bombing in 1999, mentioned earlier, and the subsequent separation of Kosovo from Serbia that culminated with its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, sponsored by the International Community. The Kosovo issue was then inextricably linked to the EU conditionality policy, meaning that Serbia, if it wanted to get closer to starting EU accession negotiations, in the spirit of good neighbourly relations had to normalize its relations with the breakaway region, thus spurring nationalist sentiment of Serbia being punished and having to renounce what was broadly considered its territory. The EU conditionality policy also implied cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the form of extradition of its nationals to the Tribunal, locally considered as heroes. Serbia eventually complied with the political conditions and started the EU accession talks in 2014, after signing the *First agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations* with Kosovo in 2013, and extraditing the last two Serbian nationals, general Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić to the ICTY in 2011. These two elements of EU conditionality policy exacerbated the sentiment of "us" vs. "them", as well as the victimization of the Serbian nation, presented as such on the supply side, that is, the political elites. Another turning point is when the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) split in 2008, and a

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reformed party was created, Serbian Progressive Party SNS (*Srpska napredna stranka*) after the elections in 2008. According to Orlović (2011) the split in the Serbian Radical Party and the establishment of Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) is the key moment in Serbian party system, also since SNS took away the former party's (SRS) voters. The party has been dominating Serbian politics since 2012, when Tomislav Nikolić became the country's President in office until 2017, when this office was taken over by his successor in SNS Aleksandar Vučić, who has been Serbian President until now, a strong populist nativist and authoritarian political leader that has led the country into serious illiberal backsliding, justified with the rhetoric of „us" vs. „them", meaning Serbia and Serbian people on the one side, and the European Union on the other, blamed for forestalling the accession of the country to the Union, without taking responsibility for the lack of progress in the necessary reforms in terms of the rule of law. However, this is a two-way process. The EU itself was facing internal and external/global problems, such as global economic crises in 2008 and 2016, the refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016, and Brexit, as well as problems with democratic levelling of newer EU Member States, such as the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism implemented in Bulgaria and Romania since their entry in the EU until today, and the increasing "illiberal backsliding" in CEE (Poland and Hungary), made the accession to the EU increasingly more difficult with more scrutiny over the candidate countries, and created Euroscepticisim and resentment from the demand-side in these countries, such as Serbia, which were happily exploited from the supply-side – the ruling elites, having as a result an exponentially growing authoritarianism in the country under the leadership of Vučić, thus getting the country closer to the general features of populism at the regional and global level.

By a similar token, the rise of nationalist populism in Croatia was also spurred by the country's EU accession efforts conditioned with the extradition of its nationals to the ICTY. In fact, Croatia started the accession negotiations in 2005 when the last national, commander of the Operation Storm general Ante Gotovina was arrested after being on the run for four years. In fact, the center-left coalition government led by Ivica Račan faced massive protests against ICTY war crimes indictments of Croatian Army officers, organized by the Homeland War veterans' organizations together with HDZ in opposition. The main rally occurred in Split in 2001 against the indictment of general Mirko Norac, who was later tried before domestic courts and found guilty in two separate war crimes trials. This created a dichotomy of "us", Croatian patriots who regard Croatian military members as heroes, in spite of being found guilty of war crimes, and "them", traitors who extradite them, and also former Communists (SDP, the leading party of the government coalition). However, when HDZ came back to power in 2007, the Prime Minister Sanader managed to cooperate with the ICTY without facing such opposition from the veterans' organization because he framed the cooperation as the ultimate service for a higher cause: joining the EU. After Croatia joined the EU in 2013, and when it was no

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longer under international scrutiny, a regression occurred. Firstly, HDZ turned more to the right, even accepting some extremist nationalists among its ranks. Secondly, several radical right parties appeared, interpreting "any kind of liberal attitude as a variant of the communist one" (Cipek 2017, 150). Most of the constituent elements of the Croatian extreme right originate directly from the WW2 Ustaša movement: a strong authoritarian state, the territorial expansion of Croatia to its ethnic borders, especially towards the Serbs, and a messianic mission of the Croatian nation as a bulwark of Catholic Christianity (Obućina 2012). However, the extreme right populist parties in Croatia, mainly represented by the *Homeland Movement* (Domovinski pokret) in the recent years, do not have that much leverage in the country that has been an EU Member State for the last 9 years. On the other hand, HDZ, that has been a dominant party since the 1990s (not in power only from 2000 to 2003, and 2007 to 2011), also plays with the populist national sentiments based certain historical legitimacy for leading the country to independence and through war. While it does not support the extreme-rightist views (although there was a sharp turn to the right in 2016 when an extreme rightist faction of HDZ came into power but was dissolved in the same year and HDZ's more moderate faction won the early elections), the party does not condemn it explicitly in order not to lose political points. Therefore, we can see that Croatia benefited from the EU accession and is currently showing a general tendency of right-wing populism rise in the country like the one in Western Europe.

When it comes to the analysis of Bosnia and Herzegovina, comparisons with the other two cases is difficult for the 21st century since we are talking about a case of contested and weak statehood, resulting from the Dayton Agreement that put an end to the 1990s war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, twenty-five years later proves to be an unsustainable arrangement for a properly functioning state. The main reasons can again be found in nationalism and the populist nativist strategies from the supply-side. The three constitutive peoples (Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats) are represented by their respective nationalist parties that hold the country hostage of their political fights. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the voting patterns show that people, although aware of the *status quo* created by being represented by nationalist populist parties of each group, still vote for their respective nationalist option out of fear that the other groups will do so, too. The most blatant example is the Bosnian Serb member of Presidency Milorad Dodik who is basing his program on the extreme nationalist views and lately made concious efforts in seceding Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina and leaving the key central institutions. Also, his strong ties with and support by Viktor Órban, Vladimir Putin, and Aleksandar Vučić, show his clear illiberal and authoritarian tendencies. Thus, we can conclude that in Bosnia and Herzegovina the main operating force on the demand side is fear combined with the urge the protect one's national group, representing a 'fertile soil' for populist success exploited by the supply side.

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3. Conclusions

To understand contemporary populism in the Western Balkans, both its supply side that is messages coming from contemporary populists and the demand side that is their reception in the public, it is necessary to study the roots of these narratives and understand long-term political processes and turbulent ideological transformations that these countries have experienced. In this paper, we provided a historical background of the most important political and social processes that formed contemporary populist narratives in the selected countries of the former Yugoslavia.

In addition to the usual populist repertoire (which implies hostility towards political opponents, the creation of a discourse of division between 'the elites' and 'the people', etc.), two ideological components were important for the development of populism in former Yugoslavia: nationalism, which was widespread in all republics, and egalitarianism, which was present in most countries as a result of socialism, appearing in various forms, such as anti-elitism or as a belief that the state should intervene in the economy in order for income to be evenly distributed.

Case studies showed how populism in different former Yugoslav countries had many common characteristics. In all these countries, populist narratives were dominated by nativism, an exclusionary form of nationalism, and egalitarianism. These common characteristics were not surprising given the genesis of these narratives (presented in Section 4 of this report). All these narratives were formed in the same context, not only because the republics were part of the same country, but because the same (or similar) events or phenomena were essential for their development (for example, conflict over language for Serbian and Croatian nationalism). Additionally, each of these narratives was partly developed in relation to the narratives in other republics, resulting in the same set of topics in all of them. It should be emphasised that nationalism and nativism were more prominent ideologies than egalitarianism. This fact supports the claim that other ideologies (such as economic liberalism, or even the ideal of egalitarianism) were only auxiliary discursive strategies (Janković 2019, 90). Nationalism was prevalent in all former Yugoslav republics, while egalitarianism was not so dominant in all countries. For example, egalitarianism was more present in Serbian than in Bosnian or Croatian societies.

Certain differences between these three republics could be perceived not only in populist narratives ('supply'), but also on the side of 'demand' (value orientations of wider social strata). Nationalism and nativism were the dominant value orientations in all three republics we observed, but not to the same extent. Generally speaking, two divergent patterns could be detected in the dynamics and prevalence of nationalism in the three countries. On the one hand, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in the late 1980s, nationalism

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was rejected by the majority of respondents, which was particularly pronounced in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A significant increase in nationalism was recorded in Croatia a year after the war ended, indicating a transition from the non-nationalist to the nationalist orientation, which is explained as a consequence of ethnic conflicts in Croatia. There were obvious similarities between the dynamics of nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, in the sense that nationalism in the period 1989–2010/2012 grew with similar intensity, but since Croatia had a different starting position, its level of nationalism was slightly higher than in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of the observed period (Janković 2019, 103). On the other hand, nationalism had different dynamics in Serbia. Nationalism in Serbia was strongest at the beginning of the observed period (1989), while it slightly declined in the 1990s (Janković 2019, 103). As we have mentioned, although nationalism and nativism were widespread in the early and mid-1990s, after the end of the war, the scores for nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina began to drop. Data gathered in the World Values Survey showed that, by the end of the 1990s, nationalism had slowly declined in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (there was no data for Croatia, since it did not participate in the 4th wave of the World Values Survey).

Regarding egalitarianism (or economic liberalism as its opposite), results demonstrated value disorientation in all observed countries. Despite these similarities between the three countries, there are some minor differences. Even though around 80% of respondents in all three countries were willing to fight for their country in the mid-1990s, it is notable that only in Serbia less than 80% of respondents were proud of their nation (6% less than in Croatia and 11% less than in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Regarding egalitarianism, there were no differences between the countries concerning acceptance of competition, while inequalities were slightly more accepted in Bosnia and Herzegovina than in Croatia and Serbia.

It is crucial for the understanding populism in the last few decades to study the distribution of value orientations (i.e., prevalence of nationalism and ambiguity towards egalitarianism) in this period. Given that value orientations were both the basis for the reception of populist messages and the consequence of populist narratives, it is clear that nationalist narratives were appealing to people and that they influenced further growth of nationalism. The implications of the results showing ambiguous stance on egalitarianism are less clear. It should be stressed that egalitarianism was proclaimed as a key value during socialism and that populists were unable to thoroughly elaborate its alternative (economic liberalism). In addition, ambiguity towards egalitarianism could be understood as a consequence of mixed messages sent by populists. On the one hand, populists' use of egalitarian narratives might have increased intensity of egalitarian value orientations in the populace, while, on the other, their criticism of communism might have caused the abandonment of egalitarianism.

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In conclusion, despite certain differences between these countries, it appears that the questions we posed in this paper can have common answers. 1) As for the influence of socialist heritage on populist narratives, we can conclude that egalitarianism is one of the derivatives of the ideals of proclaimed class equality. Although egalitarianism did not imply the acceptance of communist orientation, the ideal of social equality remained widely represented in all three republics, with this value orientation being most prevalent in Serbia (due to the economic crisis, sanctions, international isolationism, etc.). Furthermore, within the common state, interethnic tensions began to flare up, inspiring the development of nationalist and nativist narratives that reached their peak in the civil wars during the 1990s. 2) Ethnic conflicts and the 1990s wars instigated the rise of nationalism and nativism in both narratives and value orientations. The only difference was in the dynamics, nationalism became dominant in Serbia sooner than in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina it persisted longer as a dominant value orientation among the population. 3) Both nationalism and egalitarianism were prevalent in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and were the constituent elements of populism in the period 1990–2000. Nonetheless, nationalism and nativism were more dominant discourse strategies and value orientations than egalitarianism.

Therefore, as this Report showed, to understand the rise of populism since mid-2000s in the overall post-Communist world, and its specificities in the post-Yugoslav space, it is essential to look at the period of immediate transition to democracy after the fall of Communism, in the 1990s. This period set the grounds (and grievances) for the contemporary rise of populism in the region.

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